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ABSTRACT 
Information drawn from the Legislation guaranteeing municipal capital loans in 
the Province of Newfoundland passed between 1949 and 1988 is used to demonstrate a 
pronounced bias on the part of the Government to fund two to three times the dollar 
value of capital works in districts represented by the governing party as opposed to those 
represented by Opposition party members. The study concentrates on the 17 year period 
of Progressive Conservative rule from 1972 to 1989. 
The average amount guaranteed by district is calculated for each year and an 
index of bias is formulated using the ratio of average loan guarantees in Government 
districts compared to the Opposition districts. A further analysis is performed on 
individual districts that changed representation during the study period. In general 
districts that passed from Government representation to the Opposition received fewer 
loan guarantees, and districts that switched to the Government side received increased 
loan guarantees. 
The author argues in conclusion that this persbtent bias has perpetuated the long-
standing reputation of Newfoundland politics as a system in which "the victor may claim 
the spoils." 
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PREFACE 
The author of the study has a bias that the readers of this thesis should be made 
aware of. From late 1981 to March of 1989 he was the provincial leader of the New 
Democratic Party."-~swell he sat on the Opposition side of the House of Assembly as 
the member for the Labrador district of Menihek from November 1984 to March 1989. 
In his capacity as an Opposition member he had the opportunity to examine the capital 
works Joan guarantees at close hand. It was then that he began to suspect that there may 
be some bias in the way the loans were guaranteed. After retiring from active politics 
just before the 1989 provincial general election he started a systematic examination of 
the record to see if some objective evidence could be found to either corroborate or 
refute the subjective impression gained on the Opposition benches. Initially it was 
thought that all public spending could be profitably examined for evidence of bias. This 
would have included spending on highway construction, allocation of recreation grants, 
spending on public buildings as well as the municipal capital loan guarantee program. 
It quickly became obvious that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find evidence 
for most of the programs, since there was no convenient source of data for most of these 
programs. As well it was hard to compare expenditure on such things as Government 
public buildings when the regional centres received the lion's share of the spending since 
they were where the Government offices were. Similarly spending on highways was 
skewed by the existence of long stretches of the Trans-Canada Highway that existed in 
some districts and were absent completely in other districts. 
xi 
For the most part that problem did not hamper the examination of the municipal 
capital works program. There was a large body of statistical information chronicling the 
expenditure on the program going back to Confederation. This was to be found in the 
Loan Guarantee Act that was passed annually through the House of Assembly. As well, 
since Newfoundland is still a largely rural province and had in 1972 very few 
municipalities with water and sewerage, there was a possibility that the comparisons were 
between "oranges" and "oranges," and not between "oranges" and "apples". Further 
helping the analysis were the existence of areas of the province that could be used as 
controls, because they switched back and forth between the Government and Opposition 
side during the study period. 
' \ 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A. The Research Question: What is the Influence of Partisanship on Capital 
Funding for Municipalities? 
It has been common in Newfoundland politics to hear a Member of the House of 
Assembly (MHA) lauded because he was able to "deliver the goods" to his district. It 
mattered little whether those goods were a road, a breakwater, a post office building or 
a water and sewer system. Not only was partisan bias in "delivering the goods" to the 
electorate tolerated, it seemed to be applauded. Clearly no district would elect a member 
to the House of Assembly if he could not "deliver the goods." 
This personal style of politics was endemic in Newfoundland up until the 1930s. 
In his famous report Lord Amulree1 described an intense competition for political spoils 
that helped bankrupt the country. The great depression and a collapse of fish prices led 
to a fiscal crisis of monumental proportions that only abated when Britain took over the 
Newfoundland debt and the country gave up responsible government in 1934 to became 
a colony again. Amulree recommended giving the people a break from partisan politics. 
He further recommended that municipalities be established as nurseries for a new breed 
of politician. During the fifteen year break from politics few municipalities were 
established, however. 
1 Lord Amulree was the chainnan of the Newfoundland Royal Corrunission in which he and two 
corrunissioners from Canada examined the precarious state of the Newfoundland economy and its 
politics in 1933, {Report of the Newfoundland Royal Commission 1933) 
1 
In 1949 the colony became a province of Canada and the representative organs 
of government were fitfully restarted. Smallwood, who had championed the cause of 
Confederation, became the first premier of the province of Newfoundland and held 
virtually unchallenged sway until the early seventies. It was clear that he perceived no 
conflict in furthering the interests of his party by using the public purse. He almost went 
to court in 1949 for being a little too blatant while out on the campaign trail. 
... My candidate here is Mr. Greg Power, a friend of mine and I want you 
to vote for him. His opponent is Billy Browne ... if you people vote for 
him, rn not spend one cent of money in this harbour .... Remember I'm 
sitting on the public chest and not one red cent will come out of it unless 
I give the green light .... If you vote for my man, I'll spend the money 
here; but if you vote for Billy Browne, not one red cent will be spent here 
(Browne 1981, 385). 
That style of politics was clearly successful. Smallwood remained premier for 
almost twenty-three years, most often sweeping the province, leaving only a few 
scattered Opposition members in the Progressive Conservative (PC) strongholds of St. 
John's. In 1972, however, Smallwood eventually resigned after the 1971 election ended 
in a dead heat. In the spring of 1972 the PC Party under Frank Moores won a convincing 
victory with a majority government. 
With the defeat of Smallwood came the promise of a new era in provincial 
politics. Frank Moores and Brian Peckford held sway as premiers over the next 
seventeen years. Clearly here was the chance to de-personalize the politics of the 
province. Instead of using the public purse to hold on to power, decisions could now be 
2 
made that were objectively correct and that led to the greatest good for the greatest 
number. 
The question that this thesis attempts to answer is whether or not the Moores and 
Peckford administrations that held power from early 1972 to 1989 were able to avoid the 
partisan bias that had been a feature of Newfoundland politics for 140 years. 
There were allegations from the Opposition side of the House of Assembly in the 
PC years that patronage still flowed like water. All expenditure of public funds was 
examined by the Opposition for evidence of bias. Youth make-work projects, highroads 
construction, the location of vocational schools, the location of hospitals and so on, were 
all alleged to be established and maintained in such a way that they benefited the 
Government members of the House to the detriment of the Opposition members. But no 
program more consistently drew the ire of the Opposition than the allocation of capital 
funding to municipalities for water, sewerage and road projects. 
Since the water, sewerage and roads projects were so often the subject of 
controversy, this thesis will examine the spending on these projects over a seventeen year 
period to see if there was any systematic bias in the allocation of funds. Data for the 
twenty-four years prior to the Moores/Peckford regimes is also presented. However the 
inchoate state of municipal government during those years makes drawing conclusions 
difficult. It was not until the late 1960s and early 1970s that most populated areas of the 
province were incorporated into municipalities, a prerequisite to assuming the debt 
required to establish expensive municipal services. 
3 
Capital works funding for municipalities might seem to be an unusual program 
to examine for evidence of bias on the part of provincial politicians were it not for two 
unusual features of the way municipal capital works were funded in Newfoundland. The 
first is the Municipal Financing Corporation that was established in the late 1960s. The 
members of this board were appointed by the provincial cabinet. Rather than have 
individual municipalities attempt to float their own bond issues, the province created a 
central authority to market provincial bonds for Municipal infrastructure with the full 
backing of the province. Naturally if the province was to back them it also wanted to 
' 1 : ~ 
have veto power over which municipalities received the guaranteed loans. As a result, 
decisions which might be made solely by municipalities in other provinces were in fact 
made by the provincial cabinet. 
The second anomaly was the way in which the loans were repaid. Up until the 
late 1970s most small municipalities had imposed no property tax, raised little revenue 
and were unable to pay anything other than a token amount on the large loans they took 
out to build their water systems. When they were unable to meet their obligations the 
province stepped in and discharged the debts for them (Winters 1991). 
For the small municipalities this was a gold mine. Here they could have their 
water system constructed and keep their taxes low as well. The policy resulted in a flood 
of requests for capital works loan guarantees that peaked in 1972 in real terms and only 
declined (again in real terms) in the 1980s when more and more of the debt had to be 
carried by the individual municipality. 
4 
The ultimate decision on the allocation of municipal capital funding was made by 
the provincial cabinet, and for many municipalities this was less a loan than an outright 
gift. Clearly the politicians who could dispense this largesse would have a grateful 
electorate. 
This thesis will argue that the municipal capital works program was used in a 
systP.matic partisan manner that placed more importance on the political allegiance of the 
member than the needs of the community. Although the efficacy of this bias is difficult 
to gauge in strict electoral terms, this thesis will argue that the systematic bias in the 
system helped poison the political atmosphere and perpetuate the MHA as broker to the 
detriment of the perceived fairness of the political system. 
B. Specifying the Question 
This study attempts to analyze partisan bias in the allocation of scarce goods (in 
this case municipal capital works) among the communities and districts of the province 
of Newfoundland. Although it is tempting to label this practice as corrupt, this paper is 
not an examination of political c.orruption. A Dictionary of Social Sciences defines 
"corruption in public life [as] the use of public power for private profit, preferment or 
prestige, or for the benefit of a group or class, in a way that constitutes a breach of law 
or of standards of high moral conduct" (Gold 1964, 142). There is no allegation in this 
study that any law was broken, and unless the residents of the Government districts can 
be called a group or class, no allegation that any one group benefited unlawfully. 
Having said that, however, it is possible to argue that the systematic practice depicted 
5 
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here does constitute a "breach of standards of high moral conduct." Part of the problem, 
however, is that the community standards of the day seem not to have looked on the 
practice as anything other than the standard operating procedu~e. 
'I 
It is also difficult to label the practices of the PC Government as "patronage." 
The same dictionary of social science defines patronage as 
the right ve~ted in a person, official, or political party to appoint persons 
to offices and positions, to award contracts, and to dispose of emoluments 
and other favours. The person or organization holding the right to appoint 
or bestow favours is not exclusively moved by considerations of the merits 
or competence of the appointee (Gold 1964, 486). 
This thesis argues that partisan politics was one of the most important reasons for the 
allocation of municipal capital works funding, but not that there was a one to one 
relationship between the patron and the client that typifies a patronage relationship. 
Instead, what is being examined is the impartiality of the allocation of scarce 
goods among the populace. The Newfoundland Department of Municipal Affairs has 
estimated that even though $500 million has been spent since Confederation on water, 
sewer and municipal roads systems, an additional billion, dollars will be needed to 
complete the systems already planned and under way (Department of Municipal Affairs 
1989). The civil servants responsible for submitting lists of proposals to the Government 
used a combination of public safety, need and cost efficiency in their assessments(Haynes 
. '. 
1991). However, after the Minister of Municipal Affairs and the cabinet finished with 
the lists, partisan bias had altered priorities. This thesis attempts to assess how much 
partisan bias was present. 
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C. Review of Newfoundland Studies 
There have been a number of works that deal with Newfoundland politics and the 
political culture, but most have relied primarily on anecdotal evidence, and few shed 
much light on the political influence that comes to bear on the essential political question 
of "who gets what, when where and why?" One work that dealt with the political 
situation in the first half of the twentieth century was S. J. R. Noel's Politics in 
Newfoundland. Noel gave_ an overarching view of politics, but that did not advance 
beyond anecdote in describing the politics of the province. Noel does blame the deep 
financial problems of Newfoundland that led to Commission of Government on the excess 
spending, partially on the First World War, and partially on the branch lines policy of 
Edward Morris's Government (1908-1919)2• Although popular with the people, the 
branch line expansion pumped funds into a failing private railway, that nevertheless failed 
in 1922 and was taken over by the Government. Other works include the caustic Dawn 
'' 
Without Light of Herbert Pottle that portrayed Smallwood as the man who missed the 
chance to reform Newfoundland politics at the time of Confederation in 1949. As Pottle 
said of Smallwood's public spending on social services: 
It was commended much more in the partisan terms of "See what we have 
done for you," rather than in the more responsible fashion of "See what 
Canadians are doing for one another." Publicized in this way, public 
welfare increasingly became patronage on a massive scale, ... (Pottle 1979, 
15). 
2Edward Morris succeeded Sir Robert Bond as Prime Minister in 1908 and continued on as Prime 
Minister during the First World War. He was elected with the support of the Reid Railway interests 
and was made Lord Morris for Newfoundland's contribution to the war effort. (Rowe 1980, 350) 
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The most comprehensive work that has been published is the Report of the 
Amulree Commission. The Commission held country wide hearings and produced a 
report scathing in its condemnation of the Newfoundland political system at the time of 
the great depression in 1932. It derided the close patriarchal system that developed 
between the MHA and his constituents. The MHA was seen to be the broker through 
which all Government benefits would flow. 
The simple-minded electorate were visited every few years by rival 
politicians, who, in the desire to secure election, were accustomed to 
make the wildest promises involving increased public expenditu;e in the 
constituency and the satisfaction of all the cherished desires of the 
inhabitants. The latter as was not unnatural, chose the candidate who 
promised the most (Report of the Newfoundland Royal Commission 
1933, para 219). 
The feeling that politicians would promise almost anything was widespread in the 
1930s. Merchants, civil servants, newspaper reporters and ordinary workers all told 
Amulree that they felt the politicians promised too much to get elected (Fenwick 1984, , 
Amulree complains that the people had become too dependent on those in 
authority: 
... The Government was looked upon as the universal provider ... [U]nder 
the peculiar system of administration adopted in Newfoundland, he, the 
member, was not only the liaison between the people and the Government 
but the channel through which the money voted by the Legislature for 
3 In 1984 the author of this thesis examined the Magl~th papers, which contained the transcripts 
of the evidence presented to the Amulree Commission. r,1agrath was one of the three commissioners. 
Since the findings of the Amulree Commission have beeli di;puted by later Newfoundland critics (for 
a list of these critics see Rowe 1980, 394), the testimony is useful in detennining whether or not 
Amulree was reporting it "the way he heard h".: 
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public purposes within his constituency was allocated and spent (Report 
of The Newfoundland Royal Commission 1933, para 220). 
There was considerable basis for Amulree's comments from the witnesses who 
appeared before the commission. They testified that it was common practice for the 
member to appoint the roads board, who then did the hiring and firing for the road repair 
projects. Members also seemed able to override the decisions of the relieving officers 
by going to the cabinet. While some witnesses supported the system, there were others 
who wanted the process of allocating funds for public works turned over to a professional 
civil service (Fenwick 1984; '17~ 18). 
The range of benefits supplied by the member to his constituents seemed to know 
no bounds in the 1930s . 
.. . if a man lost his cow... if he had some domestic trouble... if he fell 
ill ... if the wharf in a settlement fell into disrepair ... [the member was 
expected to solve the problem]. Roads, bridges, town halls and public 
buildings; all these often superfluous luxuries, the Government through the 
member was expected to provide and maintain.... The Member on his 
part, knew that unless he gave satisfaction to the people, he stood little 
chance of reelection (Report of The Newfoundland Royal Commission 
1933, para 220). · 
Amulree blamed the lack of a deve!oped level of municipal government for the 
personal, patronage-ridden Government that evolved. He believed a strong level of 
municipal government would eliminate much of the worst abuses. Many of the witnesses 
also believed that municipal governments would take the allocation decisions out of the 
hands of the MHAs and give it to locally elected bodies who would spend responsibly 
because they would have to tax locally to raise the funds required. 
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Another work that sheds much light on the peculiar relationship between an MHA 
and his constituents is the autobiography of William J Browne, who was active in public 
life from the early 1920's to the late 1960's (Browne 1981). In 1922 he, along with two 
other Liberal4 candidates, were contesting the district of Placentia Bay. ·. Browne had 
wanted to run in St. John's for one of the Opposition parties (Conservative), but had 
been unable to get a nomination, so he, apparently without second thoughts, decided to 
run for Squires. 
Sir Richard Squires had advised us that provision had been made for 
$50,000 and we were entitled to recommend to Public Works, either for 
roads, or wharves or bridges up to that amount ... (Browne 1981, p 97). 
Once on the campaign trail the three candidates would then meet with the community 
leaders to negotiate what civic improvements were to be financed with the allotted funds. 
In Point Lance a delegation asked for support for their breakwater and the candidates 
recommended $1,000 be set aside as the first contribution toward it. In Trepassey they 
committed another $8,000 for a wharf (Browne 1981, 100-02). 
In 1956 John Crosbie, who later served as minister of Municipal Affairs under 
Smallwood, published a survey of the development of municipal institutions in 
Newfoundland. He pointed out that the populace was reluctant to form municipal 
councils in their areas for fear of property taxes being imposed. His survey ended on 
an upbeat note, however. He felt that the recent push towards incorporation of 
4William J. Browne later went on to an extensive career as a federal and provincial Progressive 
Conservative politician. Browne explains that he ran for the Liberals in 1922 despite his Conservative 
bent because there Wll$ no opening for him in this election on the Conservative ticket. ~~::: 
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municipalities since Confederation in 1949 augured well for the incorporation of 
additional municipalities. He also felt it would "ensure a solid foundation for 
parliamentary democracy"(Crosbie 1956, 345-6). Given the long delay before the great 
incorporation drive of the late 1960's, his optimism seems, in retrospect, premature. 
Another analysis of the political decision making process was done by George 
Perlin in a paper entitled "Patronage and Paternalism: Politics in Newfoundland (1971)." 
In it, he argues that the personal patronage relatio~hip between the fish merchant and 
the fisherman, in which the fisherman was looked after in bad times in exchange for the 
client's faithful patronizing of the merchant's store, was destroyed by Joseph Smallwood 
who gathered all the patronage levers in his own hands. This style of politics Perlin calls 
"paternalistic politics" (Perlin 1971, 190). Perlin argues that the patron-client 
relation!»hips between merchant and fishermen also existed between the MHA and his 
"key men," and between the key men and the electorate. All these relationships he saw 
being undermined by the dominance of Smallwood. But Perlin believed in 1971 that the 
dominance of Smallwood's paternalistic politics was waning. He cited the decline of the 
population in the outports, the increasingly costly public works needed to satisfy the 
voters, and the need to divert public funds to economic development as reasons for the 
decline of the efficacy of Smallwood's paternalistic politics (Perlin 1971, 194). He had 
a warning about the nature of politics that would follow Smallwood: 
The legitimacy of the competitive party system is threatened by 
promissory politics. As each of the parties shows that it is unable to 
satisfy the expectations of members of the support base, that base is likely 
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to become progressively narrowed. Alternative forms of political action 
may seem incl'easingly appropriate. Another danger in promissory politics 
is that the political leaders will compete with each other in using the 
resources that are available to make allocations to try to demonstrate their 
credibility at the cost of effective mobilization for the purpose of further 
development (Perlin 1971, 194-95). 
This thesis examines how some of these resources were allocated over a seventeen 
year period of time to see how the political system evolved. Perl in's words of 1971 seem 
remarkably farsighted in the 1990s. 
D. Review of Other Studies on the Same Question 
Very few studies have been done on the influence of partisan bias on public works 
\ 
spending in Canada. This is understandable. If this bias is present the politicians 
responsible for the bias are reluctant to make public the information that would prove 
that the bias exists. 5 As well spending in most programs is not broken down on an 
electoral district basis. When such a breakdown was released for the Local Initiatives 
Program (LIP) in the early 1970s it permitted an analysis of partisan b:~s_)y Donald E. 
Blake (Blake 1976). The Local Initiatives Program was one of the first winter works 
programs designed to fund projects in local communities in order to provide direct 
employment. The program started in the fall of 1971. In its first two years of operation 
5~en the author attempted to assess the allocation of municipal capital works funding whitt he was in 
the House of Assembly the goverrunent infolltVition service did not release all the funding approved. in order 
to obtain the figures on municipal capital works spending in Green Bay (at the time the Premiers District) the 
author had to glean it from the local weekly paper in Green Bay. 
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the program was the subject of criticism by Opposition Members of Parliament who 
claimed that much larger amounts were going to Government party districts than were 
justified by the need in these districts (Blake 1971, 21). In the fall of 1974 Raben 
Andras, Minister of Manpower and Immigration announced the criteria for the 1974-75 
program. The formula was tied to several factors, the most important of which was the 
unemployment rate for the province and the riding (Blake, 1976 18). Applying this 
formula to the budget for the 1974-75 year " •.. drastically reduced the amount going to 
Liberal ridings" from th".t which they had received in the previous two fiscal years. 
To determine whether there was political bias in the first two years of the 
program, Blake built a multiple regression model using total LIP allocations per capita 
as the dependent variable and the various measures of need drawn from the population 
census as the independent or explanatory variables. Need was indicated by three 
variables, the unemployment rate, the percentage of aboriginals in the riding, and the 
· percentage of adults in the riding with less than a secondary education. The education 
variable would provide a measure of the economic well being of the riding. Blake is 
careful to point out that these measures were not necessarily the variables used by the 
government department in allocating the funds. They are, however, a measure of the 
criteria that the department claimed was used to allocate funds in the 1974-75 program 
(Blake 1976, 24). 
Blake then added to the model several political variables: the percentage vote for 
the Liberals in the 1972 election, the presence of a cabinet minister or Liberal member, 
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and the competitiveness of the riding. Since these independent variables correlated 
highly with each other, Blake concentrated on using the Liberal vote in 1972 as his 
independent variable. The result was that controlling for need, " ... larger 1972-73 LIP 
allocations were associated with support for the Liberals in the 1972 federal election" 
(Blake 1976, 25). Blake further examined individual ridings in which the funding was 
considerably greater than the need factors alone would have predicted. Most of these 
ridings were held by Liberals, many by cabinet ministers, and after further analysis Blake 
concluded that even more funding went to highly competitive marginal distrit;ts than 
"safe" Liberal seats (Blake 1976, 26-27). 
Blake was able to do the analysis because the government agencies in this. case 
produced data broken down by federal ridings, both for funding under LIP as well as for 
unemployment rates, education levels and native population. He was also fortunate that 
Robert Andras, in the fall of 1974, publicly outlined the criteria that were then being 
used to make future allocations. Blake then applied these criteria retroactively in order 
to demonstrate that the previous funding had net always followed that criteria. 
Two other Canadian studies dealt with the subject of public expenditures, and how 
they are affected by political considerations. One is an 1981 article by Duff Spafford 
that attempted to correlate highway employment with elections (Spafford 1981). The 
other was a more ambitious 1975 work by John Munro that attempted a more detailed 
analysis of highway spending in British Columbia to see if economic or political factors 
were the more critical (Munro 1975). 
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Spafford examined highway employment levels in election years, comparing it to 
employment in the years immediately preceding and immediately following the election. 
To eliminate seasonal variation he chose the same month to compare each time. He 
compiled the data for 60 elections from 1948 to 1978 for all the provinces except 
Newfoundland, PEl and Manitoba. He argued that, if conventional folk wisdom were 
accurate, employment in the election year should be higher than the years preceding and 
following the election. He found that highwf.ly employment did peak in election years, 
especially employment in highway maintenance. He also found the highest correlation 
between elections and employment in Quebec, New Brun:;wick and Nova Scotia. He also 
~ I 
detected that the pronounced employment peak in an election month was characteristic 
of the period from 1948 to 1965. After 1965 the election year surge in highway 
employment was more like a gentle swell (Spafford 1981, 142). Spafford thus provides 
prima facie empirical evidence that the electoral process "biased" government operations 
in some provinces. 
John Munro was much more ambitious in his 1975 study. He attempted to isolate 
economic and political variables that might have determined road construction choices 
under the Social Credit government between 1954 and 1969. For Munro economic 
factors include the size of the electoral district, its population and distribution, the 
condition of its roads and other objective criteria for determining where to build roads. 
Political factors were whether or not the district was represented by a cabinet minister 
and whether or not the district was closely contested. Munro found that a mix of 
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economic and political factors were at play in deciding what roads to construct. Both 
political factors were found to be significant (Munro 1975, 201). 
Munro's study most closely resembles the study described in this thesis. Finding 
that cabinet membership of the MLA led to increased liklihood of road construction in 
a district is similar to the conclusion in this study that caucus membership led to more 
municipal capital works. Unlike the present study, Munro did not attempt to test the 
effect of caucus membership on road construction. This thesis will conclude that caucus 
membership is critical, but that cabinet membership confers little additional benefit on 
a district. 
A final work on patronage should also be mentioned. It is Spoils of Power by 
Jeffrey Simpson (Simpson 1988). This 1988 work is a comprehensive survey of the 
patronage system in Canada, with a breakdown of patronage practices in the provinces. 
Simpson refers to patronage, when it is practiced on whole communities, as 
"porkbarreling," when "political patrons grant discretionary benefits to whole 
communities or regions as an inducement or reward for political support"(Simpson 1988, 
13). The type of patronage that Simpson chronicles in his book generally excludes 
porkbarreling, whereas this practice is the focus of this thesis. 
E. Methodology 
Political favouritism is difficult to study. Other than subjective "hunches" usually 
from Opposition politicians, there is typically little evidence that can be examined to 
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determine whether partisan bias was pronounced, and persistent. Blake was fortunate 
that the LIP program spent millions of dollars across the country, and that he was able 
to obtain the data for that expenditure on a riding by riding basis. Analysis of the 
municipal capital works programs in Newfoundland was not as straight forward. The 
provincial Government did not publish a list of capital works allocated by provincial 
district. What was published was the legislation securing these loans, generall yon an 
annual basis (An Act To Make Provision For The Raising of Monies by Certain Local 
Authorities, Newfoundland Statutes, 1952) (Local Authority Guarantee Act, 
Newfoundland Statutes, 1959). The lists include the municipalities in alphabetic order, 
' 
along witt} the amount of the loan and the term of the loan. To determine whether there 
was a bias in the allocation of the loans, it was necessary to rearrange the data so that 
the allocation to each district could be compared. Using a computerized database a 
record was established for each community in which the capital loans could be recorded 
so that they could later be sorted by district. 
The loan amounts were assigned to analytical records for each community. Prior 
to 1983 all types of loans, be they for water, roads or for other purposes are grouped 
together since that is the way they are recorded in the legislation. The source data for 
the period from 1983 to 1988, which came from the Department of Municipal Affairs, 
were broken down by type of loan, and for that period of time the data are capable of 
being analyzed separately. If the community had only obtained water and sewerage loans, 
then it had only one record. If the community had roads loans as well, then it would 
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have two records. By this method the analysis could isolate on the funds that a single 
municipality had received, and the amounts could be easily aggregated so that a year by 
year comparison of Government and Opposition funding could be calculated. Although 
the data was collected for a period of time by type of loan, all the analysis in this study 
is based on total capital loans, be they for water, sewerage, roads or some other 
purpose.6 
A number of classification decisions were necessary to make the analysis possible. 
The first was to assign the loan guarantees as much as possible to the administration and 
the minister of municipal affairs that had mad~ the decision to approve them. Sometimes 
this was difficult to determine. For example, a bill securing loans passed in the House 
in July 1972 would give legislative approval to loans that had been approved by the 
Cabinet and made since the last bill had been passed, in 1971. For the most part this 
gave reasonably reliable results. But when an election intervened and a government 
changed, it was not possible to be certain who was responsible for approving funds 
covered by a subsequent act. In fact the bill passed in July 1972 secured an enormous 
number of loans, and was probably the work of two administrations, the last of the 
Smallwood administration, and the first of the Moores administration. Whoever was 
responsible for it, it was enormous. At $21 million it represented the greatest real 
spending ever on municipal capital works. This funding was excluded from the ar.alysis. 
6 A few loans were for special projects such as stadiwns or for special earth stabilization projects 
to prevent earth slides onto communities. The amount of capital provided for these other purposes was 
minimal. 
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Our analysis starts with the 1973 act which secured the loans approved in the previous 
year when the PCs were in power. 
One other factor served to complicate the analysis. Between the 1972 and 1975 
election the province's electoral map was redrawn with nine additional districts created. 
In order to make any analysis possible, the districts as of the 1979 election have been 
used as the basis for comparison (See Appendix E). Fortunately these fifty-two districts 
were virtually the same from 1975 onward, with the exception of the creation ofTorngat 
Mountains as a district in 1979. The communities that had been transferred from one 
district to another with redistributio_n have been put in their 197~ district in this study . 
.-;: ... 
Stephenville, for example, was established as a separate district in 1975, but prior to that 
date was a part of the Port au Port District. For our analysis Stephenville was always 
pMt of the Stephenville District. 
Aftc!" ~ggregating the amounts for each district the dependent variable, funding 
per district per year, was isolated. The independent variable, the political party of the 
member representing that district for that year, was also recorded on each record for 
each year. 
In Blake's LIP study it was relatively straightforward to construct the indicators 
of socio-economic "need." The data on unemployment, percentage of native population 
and educat~on level were readily available from the Population Census. No similar 
indicators of need were available to use in an examination of municipal capital works 
funding in Newfoundland. With one exception there were no data available to indicate 
-·----
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which towns needed and wanted to put in water and sewage systems. Many communities 
in the province are so sparsely settled that well systems and septic tanks are seen to be 
an ideal solution that precludes the installation of a municipal system. Similarly the need 
for paved roads is also difficult to quantify given the lack of data on the length of roads 
and their condition in each community and whether or not paving them is seen to be a 
priority of the town or community council. 
However in 1989 the Department of Municipal Affairs made some data available 
from which an indirect indicator could be constructed. This was a list of the sums of 
money required to complete all the projects then under construction or in the planning 
stage. According to the list cne billion dollars would be needed. The data from this list 
were entered into the computer data base for analysis. The results showed that the sums 
required to complete the ongoing projects were roughly equal in Opposition and 
Government districts. When the total needed to complete the projects was compared to 
the amount already spent, Opposition districts were about twenty-five percent complete 
in their projects, and Government districts were about twenty-eight percent complete. 
What this data suggests is that "on average" Government and Opposition districts 
have a relatively equal need for Municipal Capital Works funding. It would follow then 
that, on an ongoing basis if need were the governing criteria, the funding for Opposition 
districts and Government districts should be relatively equal. It should also follow that 
a district that switches back and forth from the Government to the Opposition side of the 
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House should continue to receive roughly the same amount of funding on a year by year 
basis. 
Thus the null hypotheses are: 
A. Funding for Municipal Capital Works for individual districts is 
dependent on the needs of the district which, since they are similar 
over time, should result in relatively equal funding for each district 
over time. 
B. Funding in an individual district, if it is dependent on actual need, 
should not change when the political party of its MBA changes. 
To quantify the issue, an index was constructed. The funding for all the Opposition 
districts was totalled by year, and an average for each district was calculated. The same 
thing was done for the Government districts. These averages were then divided into each 
other to give an index for the individual year. Mathematically: 
GOI = G<avel 
O(ave) 
Where GOI is the Government/Opposition index, and G(av~) is the average 
spending per Government district and O(ave) is the average spending per Opposition 
district. 
If the spending follows the assumption we have made, that the needs are equal in 
Opposition and Government districts, then the index should roughly equal 1.0. The 
index was calculated on a yearly basis between 1973 and 1988, making it is possible to 
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examine each year for evidence of greater or lesser bias. A supplementary index 
was also prepared based on the average funding for cabinet ministers districts: 
COI=CCavel 
O(ave) 
Where COl is the Cabinet/Opposition index, C(ave) is the average spending per 
cabinet members district, and O(ave) is the average spending per Opposition members 
district. An attempt was made to discover if there was a pronounced bias in favour of 
their districts similar to the bias Blake found in favour of Liberal cabinet ministers 
ridings in the LIP study. 
F. Description of The Data Collection Method 
There were three major sources for the data used in this study. The first was the 
Local Authority Guarantee Act and its predecessor. 7 The second was a set of internal 
department documents containing statistical summaries from the department of Municipal 
Affairs outlining capital works guaranteed loans for a period from 1983 to 1988. The 
internal documents from the department listed all the loan guarantees approved by cabinet 
by fiscal year starting in 1984.8 Table 1.1 identifies the exact time period that each piece 
of legislation or government document records the loan guarantees for. The third was the 
'From 1949 to 1983 the main source of data i~ from the Local Authority Guarantu Act J9S7, and its yearly 
amendments. These acts of the Newfoundland House of Assembly are passed yearly to sec~re loan guarantees 
authorized by orders-in-council of the cabinet. 
'The Data from the Department of Municipal Affairs are lists of loans approved by order-in council from 
1983 to 1988. 
22 
comments from informants who participatec in the decision making process that led to 
these lists. 9 (See the Jist of informants in Appendix A) 
The Local Authority Guarantee Act and especially its amendments which contained 
the schedule of loans being approved was the greatest source of data. Under the terms 
of the act all guaranteed loans must be approved by a vote in the House of Assembly 
amending the Local Authority Guarantee Act and its predecessor. As a result there are 
Jist upon Jist of approved loans available from the Queen's Printer. For the most part 
these amendments were passed yearly, and it took little effort to determine what time the 
decisions were made. That determination was crucial to the study since this study is 
essentially an examination of the decision making process that led to the funding 
allocations. Unfortunately there are a few periods where the legislation was delayed and 
the lists would cover several years of municipal capital works. The most extensive of 
these periods was from 1983 to 1986; one huge bill was passed in 1986 to secure three 
years worth of loans. Fortunately the Department of Municipal Affairs was able to 
provide lists of approved loans for those years by the date they were approved by the 
cabinet. 
The data from the legislation and the lists from Municipal Affairs were coded into 
a database. The database design is outlined in Table 1.1. The unit of data is the 
municipality, with fields tc(record the name of the District as of 1988, the name of the 
,. 
'The infonnants will be referred to by their last name and the year of the imerview. The interviews were 
taped, and some of them were transcribed as part of the process of preparing this thesis. 
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member of the House of Assembly for that district and the name of the party the member 
belonged to as of 1988. The structure of the record is described in table 1.1. 
Finally, the author conducted a series of interviews with many of the principals 
involved in the decision making to attempt to assess some of the explanations that had 
been put forward by the individuals who had taken part in the decision making. In these 
interviews, some of the statistical findings were presented to the respondents, and they 
were asked to explain these results. 
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Table 1.1 - Description of Fields in Database 
NAME OF FIELD DESCRIPTION OF FIELD TYPE OF DATA'0 
DJSTRICT · The Name of the Provincial District A 
MEMBER Name of !he Member for !he District in 1988 A 
PARTY The Members Party in 1988 A 
GOVS271 Whelher lhe district was represented by a 
Government member from 1949 to 1971 L 
GOV72 Government member from 1972 to 1975 L 
GOV75 Government member from 1975 to 1979 L 
GOV79 Government member from 1979 to 1982 L 
CAB79 Cabinet Member form 1979 to 1982 L 
GOV82 Government member from 1982 to 1985 L 
CAB82 Cabinet Member from 1982 to 1985 L 
GOV85 Government member from 1985 to 1989 L 
CAB8S Cabinet Member from 1985 to 1989 L 
MUNICIPALY Name of lhe Municipality A 
LPURP Loan purpose ie Water & sewer or roads A 
LOAN4963 Total amount of loans in the municipality 
from 1949 to 1963 N 
LOAN6466 Loans in !he municipality from 1964 to 1966 N 
LOAN6771 Loans in lhe municipality from 1967 to 1971 N 
LOANAM1i2 Loans in lhe Municipality in 1972 N 
LOANAM1i3 
to LOANAMT88 Loans in the Municipality from 1973 to 1988. N 
COSTCOMP The cost to complete all systems for the 
municipality estimated by Municipal Affairs 
in 1989 N 
TODATE Total of this type of loan (water/roads) 
Loans guaranteed for this municipality 
since 1949 N 
REQ8990 Amount requested by the municipality for the 
fiscal year 1989-90 N 
POP Population of the Municipality in 1986 
(from Statistics Canada) N 
INCORPYR Year Municipality was incorporated D 
CTY Whelher the municipality was a town, 
community council or other. A 
10 ~ = Alphanumeric Data, L = Logical Field, N = Numeric Data (In dollars except for POP population, 
D =Date 
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Table 1.2 - Descripdon of the Time Periods 
Actually Covered in Each Yeer Represented 
YEARCS) CODED FOR ACTUAL TIME PERIOD COVERED 
63 (49 to 63) April 1949 to June 20, 1963 
66 (64 to 66) June 21, 1963 to December 14, 1966 
71 (67 to 71) December 15, 1966to June 2, 1971 
72 June 2, 1971 to July 5, 1972 
73 July 6, 1972 to May 1, 1973 
74 May I, 1973 to May 21, 1974 
1S May 22, 1974 to June 25, 1975 
76 June 25, 1975 to June 11, 1976 
77 June 12, 1976 to June 17, 1977 
78 June 18, 1977 to November 21, 1978 
79 November 22, 1978 to August 17, 1979 
80 August 18, 1979 to June 6, 1980 
81 June 7, 1980 to July 14, 1891 
82 July IS, 1981 to December 3, 1982 
83 December 4, 1982 to December 21, 1983 
84 Mid 1983 to March 31, 1984 
85 April 1, 1984 to March 31 , 1985 
86 April 1, 1985 to March 31, 1986 
87 April 1, 1986 to March 31, 1987 
88 April 1, 1987 to March 31, 1988 
There is a large time gap between The December 21, 1983 bill and the next bill to' p~ through the legislature 
on June 17, 1986, almost two and a half years later. The Deparunent of Municipal Affnir!l helped fill the gap 
by providing a detailed breakdown of the approved loans by fiscal year and by order-in-council number. The 
time of approval by 0-1-C is much earlier than the date of the legislation that eventually secures the loan in the 
legislature. In order to prevent loan guarantees being counted twice, once when the 0-1-C was issued, and 
again when the legislation was passed, the loan amounts for these years were carefully screened and placed in 
the most appropriate year. To further guard against error, the figures from Municipal affairs were carefully 
compared to the amounts eventually secured by the 1986 le~slation. Since the switch had been made and the 
figures were able to be pinned down as to time and minister, the Municipal Affairs data was used to the end 
of the study period March 31, 1988. The net effect of changing the data wurce would be to reduce the total 
spent in 1983 and 1984 somewhat and to increase the amount spent in 1985. Since these were not election 
years, it should not affect the basic allocation of the data to Government or Opposition districts. 
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For the most part the unit of analysis is the provincial district. From 1972 until 
1975 there were forty~two districts in the province with an average of about eleven to 
twelve thousand people in each one. In 1975 redistribution added nine more districts, 
and another was added for the 1979 election. Although some redistribution and 
redrawing of boundaries occurred in the 1980s, the number of districts remained fixed 
at fifty-two. The average population of each district is about eleven thousand. With few 
exceptions most districts in the province are rural in nature. With the exception of the 
St. John's area and Corner Brook the largest towns have only ten-thousand people in 
them and there are only a half dozen of these. The St. John's metropolitan area11, with 
approximately 100,000 people in it has historically been well serviced with water and 
sewerage, and for much of the study period did not acquire its loans via the Loc(ll 
Authority Guarantee Act. Districts within this area have therefore been excluded from the 
study. The remaining forty districts left are a large enough population from which to 
draw conclusions about statistical patterns. During most of the study period there was a 
good mix of Government and Opposition districts to be able to make valid comparisons. 
G. Description of the Interview Methods Employed 
Although the data collection revealed a pattern that suggested the Government was 
favouring its own districts to the detriment of Opposition districts, Government 
11The Districts not covered in this study are St.John's East, St. John's Centre, St. John's North, St. John's 
West, St. John's South, Pleasantville, Waterford-Kenmount. 
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politicians had alleged from time to time that the bias was justified to counterbalance the 
neglect the PC districts had suffered at the hands of the Liberals in the past. However 
it should be noted that outside St. John's vinually every district was represented by a 
Liberal Member from 1949 to 1971. They also maintained that this was just the way the 
needs were distributed and it was only a legitimate response to the areas where the need 
was the highest. To test these arguments, a series of interviews were arranged with 
informants who should be able to say whether theses arguments were valid or not. The 
first group interviewed were the civil servants who occupied senior posts in the 
Department of Municipal Affairs when the decisions were made. The statistical tables 
were used as a stimulus to encourage the respondents to focus on particular years when 
they were in the bureaucracy that supported and took part in the decision making by the 
politicians. The second major group interviewed were all but one of the Ministers of 
Municipal Affairs from 1972 until 1989. Most of the interviews took place in the homes 
and offices of the respondents during the fall of 1991. The interviews wert taped and 
transcribed. as required for analysis. These interviews were used to help draw 
conclusions and deal with some of the rationalizations that were put forward for the 
results. 
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2. CAPITAL WORKS FUNDING - IDSTORICAL OVERVIEW 
A. Historical Attitudes to Taxation and Local Government 
To understand contemporary attitudes toward the funding of public works at the 
local level it is helpful see how these attitudes were formed in the settlement of 
Newfoundland. Newfoundland was first used as a fishing station. Fishing fleets from 
many European nations sent their fleets to fish on the fabled Grand Banks of 
Newfoundland. The French, the Basques, the Portuguese, the Spanish and the English 
all fished off the shores of Newfoundland. Of all of these nations only the English with 
their lack of salt showed a need to settle in the coves of what was one large mother ship 
in the Atlantic. The English were forced to use a light cure that called for extensive 
flakes on shore to allow the sun to help in the curing of the fish. Settlement was sparse 
and fitful until the last decade on the eighteenth century (Noel 1971, 4). When the 
commercial seal fishery was established in the 1790s its prosecution in the winter and 
early spring lured more migratory fishermen to winter over and become permanent 
settlers. That, combined with a wartime boom in the fisheries in the first fifteen years 
of the 1800s, led to a rapid increase in population. Permanent settlements interfered with 
the migratory fishery however, and permanent settlement was difficult. Therefore until 
the start of the 1800s settlement was virtually nonexistent off the Avalon peninsula. 
The Newfoundland economy, with its migrant fishermen, mitigated against the 
establishment of permanent towns with local government. .\he firs_t municipality to 
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incorporate was St. John's in 1888, close to 400 years after its first occupation by 
. -
Europeans. Municipal formation was so slow that it was fifty years later that the second 
town was incorporated. In 1938 Grand Falls Station, a rapidly expanded suburb of the 
company town of Grand Falls established an elected council (Royal Commission on 
Municipal Government in Newfoundland and Labrador 1974, 30).12 At Confederation 
in 1949 there were only twenty incorporated municipalities scattered around the province. 
The closest thing to modern towns were the company towns set up, regulated and owned 
by the mining and logging companies. Grand Falls, Buchans, Lewisporte, Corner Brook 
and Bell Island had all been forms of company towns. As company towns they were run 
by the company and later by appointed councils and received most of their revenue from 
the company. As a result they gained little exr;erience with democratic in:;titutions and 
the art of imposing, collecting and spending taxes, a deficiency that the Whalen Royal 
Commission noted in its report: 
The local failure stems from a strong desire on increasing numbers of civil 
leaders and citizens for more extended municipal services which is not 
accompanied by their willingness to assume an adequate level of municipal 
financial responsibility for the cost of those services (Whalen Commission 
1974, 12). 
In the Confederation campaigns of the 1860s and the 1940s one of the anti-
confederate arguments was that "Canada would tax your property away from you" 
(Whalen Commission 1974, 26). Its use in these campaigns reflected the antagonism 
12Hereafter referred to as the Whalen Commission. 
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most Newfoundlanders felt toward local taxation. For Newfoundlanders in general 
municipal government and taxes were anathema. Since, according to liberal British 
theory, municipalities are training grounds for sound democratic government, their 
virtual absence prior to Confederation led Lord Amulree to remark that it was this lack 
that led to the particularly corrupt state of Newfoundland politics (Newfoundland Royal 
Commission 1933 para 220). Unfortunately the Commission of Government instituted 
at the suggestion of the Amulree Commission was not very successful at promoting 
municipal government, and their decade-and-a-half (1934-1949) passed with little or no 
progress in establishing municipalities despite repeated attempts to encourage 
incorporation (Whalen Commission 1974, 31).13 
In the decades before Commission of Government the local MHA helped decide 
which roads water and sewerage services were provided. With forty MHA's in 1930 for 
a population of less than 300,000 the MHA's were expected to help arrange for the 
services normally delivered by a municipality. They secured a small grant to fix the road 
each spring, they got the wharf fixed, they arranged for the drilling of a community well 
and so on. Most of this work appeared to be deliberately scheduled for the election 
campaign as if to reinforce this connection between the Government MHA and public 
works.( William Browne in his biography describes his first election campaign in 1922 
"The Whalen Conunission records instances of threats and physical abuse against proponents of municipaJ . -'· 
government during Ute Conunission of Goverrunent period (p 31). 
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when he steps out with his fellow Liberal candidate armed with a budget of $50,00014 
from Sir Richard Squires (Browne 1981, 97). 
One of the primary goals of Commission of Government was to fill this lacuna 
and provide training in municipal government to the people. Unfortunately it was able 
to accomplish little, eventually providing services through magistrates and Newfoundland 
Rangers, the all purpose government men who provided everything from law 
enforcement, to customs work, to social work to spying (Neary 1988, 51-52). As a 
result, when Confederation with Canada finally arrived in 1949, Newfoundland's 
Municipal infrastructure and store of accomplished municipal and provincial politicians 
was still inadequate. The weak state of the infrastructure led to a demand for water, 
sewage and road construction, but the lack of local politicians with a tradition of 
responsibility and accountability led to a peculiar response from the provincial 
Government. 
B. The Smallwood Government's Approach 
Given J. R. Smallwood's background the organization of strong responsible 
municipal governments should have been a priority. He was an organizer. In his life 
he had organized unions, co-operatives and political parties. He even organized for the 
American Socialist Party (Gwyn 1972, 31-32). He had a brief stint as an adherent. of 
14This $50,000 was in Canadian dollars. Newfoundland had switched to the Canadian dollar after the 
Newfoundland bank collapse in 1895. 
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Coaker and the Fishermen's Protective Union (FPU), one of the first mass parties of 
Newfoundland. Given his background he could have brought an organizing activist 
attitude to his job as Premier of Newfoundland. In the years immediately after 
Confederation with Canada in 1949 many municipalities were incorporated. But the 
"boomlet" of the early fifties was short lived (Crosbie 1956, 345). It was only in the 
latter part of his tenure as premier that much progress was made in incorporating new 
communities and establishing municipal infrastructure (Whalen 1974, 35). Why 
Smallwood lost interest in the formation of municipalities in the decade between 1955 
and 1965 is unclear. But it might be that his economic development program 
monopolized his time. Installing municipal capital works proceeded slowly in the first 
fifteen years of Smallwood's administrations. From 1949 to 1963, spending on 
municipal capital works15 averaged a mere one million dollars per year. Incorporated 
municipalities were few and far between, and no real initiative to form more was made 
until the mid 1960s. In the 1960s the formation of local government units accelerated. 
One factor causing this was the threat of resettlement. The Federal-Provincial 
resettlement program of the late 1960s was intended to assist households to move to 
larger communities with better services. As the program grew, entire communities that 
agreed to move received additional grants to help in the resettlement. Some communities 
15Municipal capital works generally include wattr and sewer projeciS, road construction and repair, and 
occasionally other municipal projeciS such as arena construction 
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thus perceived the program as a threat to their survival, and incorporated (with 
government encouragement) as a way of fending off resettlement. 
The late 1960s was a period of substantial growth in many communities. This 
growth brought with it problems of pollution and water shortages, forcing the 
communities to ask the Government to help them install water and sewer systems. But 
perhaps the greatest stimulus to the formation of municipal government in this era was 
the generous operating and capital works grants provided to municipalities by the 
provincial Government to incorporate (Whalen 1974, 38). Enormous numbers were 
formed16, and spending on capital works increased greatly to an average of $9 million 
a year in the 1964-1966 Smallwood administration (Local Authority Guarantee Act 1957, ,· . . 
1964 to 1966 amendments). Although it declined slightly in the 1967-71 Smallwood 
administration, it never declined to the pre 1964 level. 17 
A deputy minister in the Department of Municipal Affairs at the time felt they (he 
and the other civil servants) were sparking a revolution in rural Newfoundland, giving 
Newfoundlanders some sense of ownership of their communities (Withers 1991). Later 
on this civil servant came to rue the day he helped incorporate so many communities, as 
their appetite for capital to build more and more muni~ipal infrastructure became 
impossible to satisfy (Withers 1991). 
16The 105 municipalities in 1962 increased to 168 in 1967, to 255 in 1972, and to 290 in 1974, almost 
tripling in twelve years (Whalen Commission 1974, 35). 
17Municipa1 Budgets also increased greatly during this period, from under $8 million in 1962 to over $46 
million in 1974 (Whalen Commission 1974, 35) 
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During the fifties, Premier Smallwood, dispensed capital grants on a personal 
basis (Perlin 1971, 193). Applications for capital grants went to the cabinet on a 
piecemeal basis with no priority established whatsoever (Withers 1991). The most 
important intermediary was not the civil servant, but Premier Smallwood who dispensed 
these loans on a personal basis. When the total annual capital funding for municipal 
capital works projects in the province amounted to less than one million dollars going to 
a handful of communities this was not a broad concern. When the sums started to 
increase greatly in the subsequent PC administrations, potentially reaching every rural 
district, the MHA 's and the cabinet ministers started taking a more active role in the 
decision making process (Withers 1991); (Haynes 1991); (Corbett 1991). 
C. Overall Funding From 1972 to 1988 
In the sev~nteen year period of time examined closely in this study, municipal 
capital loans guaranteed by the province varied from a low of $9 million in 1973 to a 
high of $44 million in 1983. In the 1970s spending ranged from below $10 million to 
just over $20 million with the exception of the election year 1979, when spending 
ballooned to over $30 million. With the exception of 1983 and 1984, spending in the 
1980s remained quite steady at around $30 million a year. In 1983 and 1984 spending 
peaked at just over $40 million per year. (See figure 2.1) However growth in real terms 
was less, due especially to high inflation in the 1980s. In real dollars (adjusted for the 
St. John's Consumer Price Index) the highest yearly spending for capital works occurred 
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in 1972, when $50 million in 1981 dollars was expended. The second highest sum was 
for 1979, also an election year, and the third highest was in 1983, a year after an 
election.18 In the decade from 1974 to 1984 virtually each year saw b~tween $30 and 
$37 million expended. The only exceptions are the 1978-79 years in which the spending·' 
dipped to $21 million in 1978 and rebounded to $41 million in 1979. It was almost as 
if the Government saved up in the inter election years in order to make a big splash 
during the election year. However, this apparent anomaly may simply reflect the way 
in which the legislation was passc!d through the House of Assembly. The bill securing· 
the loans (~as usually made after the spending was complete on the projects. In the 
,,, . 
. ~ .• 
1978-79 peri~d the spending might have been relatively constant, with just the timing of 
th 1 . I . II ak' . th . . . I . 1 e eg1s atiOJ} m mg It appear at great var1at1ons were occurnng. t 1s a so apparent 
-~ · 
that spending since 1984 haS been diminishing in real terms to pre-1972 levels. 
Before too much weight is given to an apparent connection between higher 
spending and election years, one should examine the spending in 1983 and 1984, the only 
two years in which spending topped $40 million in nominal terms. Some explanation for 
these result is needed besides the proximity of an election. Since 1982 to 1984 were the 
years in which the province was emerging from a recession, it just may be that the 
. 
1Bnle date each administration took over is listed in Appendix B. In lhe era we are examining Frank 
Moores became premier in February 1972 and called an election in March. His Government was re-elected 
in September 1975, and he turned over lhe Premiership to Brian Peclcford in March 1979. Peclcford won 
- ·- elections in June 1979, April 1982 and April 1985. Peclcford resigned as premier in March 1989 and Tom 
Rideout became premier. He lost the April 1989 election to the Liberals under Clyde Wells. 
:• 37 
Peckford Government was attempting to "kick start" the economy by spending on public 
works.19 
Ovel'all spending on an unadjusted nominal basis increased from 1973 until it 
peaked in 1979, and except for 1983 and 1984 spending remained at a $30 million a year 
plateau for most of the 1980s. When inflation was taken into account spending peaked 
in 1972 and then levelled off for much of the 1970s before declining after 1982. This 
suggests that there could have been much pent up demand for capital works 
improvements in the municipalities. 
19 Hazel Newhook, the minister of Municipal Affairs at this time claims that lhe spending in lhese two years 
was a deliberate attempt to stimulate the economy by increasing Municipal Capital Works. (Newhook, 1991) 
38 
3. THE MOORES ADMINISTRATIONS 
A. The First Moores Administration: 1972-1975 
Our detailed study of the politics of capital works spending starts with the 1973 
bill, the one that was the responsibility of the first Moores administration. Moores had 
led the Progressive Conservatives to a great victory in 1972. The opposition Liberals 
held on to just nine seats (See Appendix F for provincial election results from 1949 to 
1989). The 197~ bill was small in comparison to the great election bill of 1972, and was 
. 
even more so when one considers that the early 1970s were a time of great inflation. 
The real purchasing power of the 1973 bill was less than 40 per cent of its predecessor. 
Despite its small amount however it seemed to be distributed with partisan 
evenhandedness. In fact the Opposition districts did better than the Government districts. 
The GOI index was for the first, and last time, less than 1.0. (See Figure 3.1) For every 
dollar an Opposition district received, a Government district received seventy cents. The 
Liberal Districts on the whole received more than the Government districts. 20 The 
numbers. however, are deceiving. Two Liberal districts in central Newfoundland, Fogo 
and Bonavista North accounted for over 75 per cent of the spending. In Fogo the 
spending prior to 1972 had been in the two communities of Fogo and Musgrave Harbour. 
In Bonavista North the spending was more widespread with seven communities working 
::osee figure 3.1 for the dollar amounts that were used to calculate the GOI. The nwnber of districts used 
to calculate the average was adjusted to compensate for the St. John's districts and for the Labrador districts 
that received most of their funding from other sources. 
39 
Gov. Tot 
Gov. Ave. 
Opp. Tot. 
Opp. Ave. 
Gov/Opp 
Figure 3.1 
Moores' Administrations 
Capital Loans Distribution 
Gov/Opp Ratio 
3.0 -.----------------. 
2 5 ············································ . 
2.0 
1.5 
1.0 
0.5 
0.0 
73 74 75 76 77 78 79 
6.2 14.8 16.0 19.2 16.0 11.0 21.2 
0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.9 
2.4 2.7 2.0 1.9 8.0 4.0 10.8 
0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.5 
.. 0.7 1.5 2.2 2.8 1.8 2.4 1.7 
In $ Million per Year 
40 
on water and sewerage systems in this time period. The biggest project was in Hare Bay 
where almost a million and a half was spent. Harold Collins, the Gander MHA who was 
minister of Municipal Affairs at this time, believes that much of the funds expended, 
especially in Opposition districts was to complete ongoing projects (Collins 1991). If 
these two districts had not received such a large amount of funding, the index might have 
not favoured the Opposition districts. 
In the Progressive Conservative Districts most of the money spent in 1973 was 
spent in Corner Brook, partially represented by the premier, and Burgeo. In subsequent 
years, however funding started to flow to other PC districts. By 1976 Gander, Grand 
Falls, Bonavista South, Green Bay, Corner Brook, Stephenville, and Trinity Bay de 
Verde had received over one million dollars a year each. 
Although the Moores administration started off being more than evenhanded in 
1973, they soon started to increase municipal capital funding in Government districts. In 
1974 spending in Government districts doubled, while the amounts going to Opposition 
districts remained almost constant. The index stood at 1.49 indicating that Government 
districts received almost fifty p~.~cent more than their Opposition counterparts. For the 
next two years (1975-76) the amounts going to Opposition districts actually dropped 
while the amounts going to Government districts incr~ed by close to $3 million per 
year. By 1976 the index was at 2. 76 indicating an almost three to one bias in funding. 
During most of this time Brian Peckford was the Minister of Municipal Affairs. In 
September of 1976 Peckford left the portfolio and was replaced by a Pleasantville MHA 
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Jerome Dinn who remained minister until the fall of 1978. During Dinn's time as 
minister the Government districts taking advantage of capital .works projects doubled, 
ifrom fifteen in 1973 to thirty i~ .J.976. The five Opposition districts that had received 
···.. .. 
funding in 1973 had been reduced to four by 1976. 
B. The Second Moores Administration: 1975-1979 
In the first Moores Administration we have seen that the evenhanded policies 
pursued by Harold Collins and Val Earle were replaced by mounting partisanship under 
Minister Brian Peckford. By June 1976 the funding was almost triple in Government 
districts when compared to Opposition <li~tricts (GOI 2.8). In September 1976 Jerome 
Dinn became the new minister of Municipal Affairs, and in the first year, the index of 
I 
partisanship dropped by a third to less .than double (GOl 1.8). In the next year however 
.. 
partisanship returned and Dinn's_tenure ended with a partisanship ratio that crept back 
to 2.4. In October of 1978 Neil Windsor became Minister of Municipal Affairs and the 
ratio dropped to 1.7 in 1979, and an almost evenhanded 1.2 in 1980. Not since the early 
1970s had a minister of Municipal Affairs presided over such an evenhanded distribution 
of funding. Nonetheless in the three years of this administration all Government districts 
received funding in virtually alJ years. Only four Government districts failed to receive 
loans in each of the years, and that was for one year only. (Menihek and St. Mary's The 
Capes in 1977, Nauskapi in 1978 and Harbour Main in 1979.) Almost half (ten) of the 
Opposition districts failed to receive funding in at least one year of this period. Several, 
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such as Fogo, Eagle River and Twillingate were excluded tw() of the three years. 
Torngat Mountains was excluded an three years, but its location in Labrador may have 
allowed it to access other funds. It is included at this point because it accesses funding 
from the program in 1982. 
Nineteen seventy eight is the most partisan of these three years with two and a 
half times as much going. to the Government districts as the Opposition ones. At $15 
million in spending, it is also the year when the least was spent. The 1979 figures were 
in the legislation passed in August 1979, just three months after the June 1979 election 
in which Brian Peckford gained his first mandate as premier. It guaranteed the loans 
approved in Cabinet in the previous year and in the period leading up to and including 
the 1979 election. Given that the water or sewer system has to be constructed or the 
road paved and completed before the loan is secured by legislation, most if not all, of 
the loans secured in the August 1979 act were approved prior to Brian Peckford 
becoming premier. 
For the most part funding in this time period (1975-79) went to the larger 
communities. Towns receiving ov~r one million dollars in this three year period include 
Bonavista, Carbonear, Botwood, Gander and Grand Falls, Mount Pearl, Conception Bay 
South, Corner Brook, Windsor and Clarenville. But smaller towns also received large 
amounts. Massey Drive, near Corner Brook, with only 415 people received over one 
million dollars, the highest sum per capita of any town. Other small towns that did very 
well on a per capita basis were Trinity and Dover in Bonavista South, Coachman's Cove 
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in Baie Verte-White Bay, Gillam's in Bay of Islands, Port au Bras in Burin Placentia 
West, Melrose in Trinity North, and North West River in Naskaupi. 
Few of these small towns are able to fully pay the massive amounts required to 
finance these water and sewage systems.21 The larger towns that had been receiving 
loans for water, sewage and roads projects, repaid their loans (Withers 1991). Now the 
smaller mtnlicipalities were building their own infrastructure, and as they did the index 
of partisanship (GO I} started to rise. (See figure 3.1, especially from 1975 to 1979) It 
could be that the more rural communities with the weak tax base are the ones that will 
prosper or suffer more at the hands of a Government that can decide whether they get 
their capital works funding or not. We will examine that question more closely in 
Chapter 5 when we look at the difference in the way rural and urban districts were 
funded when they changed their representation from Government to Opposition or thee 
reverse. 
21Everyone concerned from the Cabinet to the town officials themselves knew that the loan guarantc:e11 
were, in fact, mostly grants. 
44 
4. THE PECKFORD ADMINISTRATIONS 
A. Tbe First Peckford Administration: 1979-1982 
Brian Peckford became Premier on the heels of a number of scandals that plagued 
the latter part of the Moores Administration. There were allegations of kickbacks from 
contractors who had given television sets to Cabinet ministers, and Tom Farrell, one of 
Moores' cabinet ministers, was caught up in a fire that was alleged to be arson. Brian 
Peckford promised a new broom approach in which his caucus members would be clean. 
One would expect that a major capital works program like the municipal capital works 
program would be handled without excessive political bias, and for the first year it was. 
Neil Windsor remained at Municipal Affairs in the 1979-80 year, and the evenhandedness 
that characterized his first year as minister when the GOI of partisanship dropped by a 
third continued. Loans authorized by the 1980 act were almost balanced, with the GOI 
ratio at 1.2. However when Windsor left the Department in the fall of 1980, and was 
replaced by Hazel Newhook, partisanship increased markedly. In 1981 the index doubled 
to 2.5, and continued at the 2.0 level in 1982. (See figure 4.1) 
The 1982 figure understates the actual pro-Government bias because its calculation 
treats Baie Verte-White Bay as an Opposition district. In fact, the Liberal member Tom 
Rideout crossed to the Government side in 1981. (Rideout would later become a cabinet 
minister in the Peckford government before succeeding him as premier in 1989.) If the 
$2.5 million approved for Baie 'lerte-White Bay were switched to the Government 
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side, the index of partisanship would be as high in 1982 as it was in 1981.22 On the 
Government side the spending was widely spread, with each district receiving funding 
each year, with the exception of Stephenville and Port de Grave. On the Opposition side 
only nine out of nineteen . .- , )'icts were funded each year. Bellevue was never funded, 
and Carbonear, Fogo, Grand Bank, Port au Port and Torngat Mountains received funding 
only one year. Grand Bank, which had been funded yearly prior to the 1979 election 
became an Opposition district after the election and was almost totally cut off. St. 
· .. · 
Barbe, which had also switched sides saw its funding dwindle, then disappear completely 
in 1982. On the other side Fortune Hermitage which had gone from Opposition to 
Government tripled its loan amou~ts. Some districts, like Burgeo Bay D'Espoir switched 
to the Government side without doing appreciably better. But there were very few of 
these. No district went from the Opposition ranks To the Government side without at 
least receiving the same amount of funding as it did previous to the election. The 
treatment afforded districts that switched from the Government to the Opposition side is 
the strongest evidence we have that political bias was at work in the process (See Chapter 
5). 
On a municipality by municipality basis, the large towns still accounted for a 
large share of the capital loan guarantees. Corner Brook, Conception Bay South and 
Grand Falls did especially well in these years. However even more small towns and 
=The recalculated index with Baie Verte-While Bay on the Government side would be between 3 and 4. 
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communities are also receiving funding~ On a per capita basis, North West River fared 
best with over $3,000 approved per capita, a pattern that was repeated in later years in 
other Labrador communities. Cartwright, for example was the next most expensive 
installation based on population. On the Island, Trinity in Bonavista Bay and Pilley's 
Island in Green Bay were the next most expensive per capita. Green Bay as a whole had 
four very expensive installations, ones that cost more than one thousand dollars per 
person, during this administration. The pattern of approving loans for small communities 
that had little chance to repay their loans continued. So did the partisan bias. 
The Blake study of LIP spending found that cabinet members' ridings received 
more funding than other districts, controlling for both socio-economic factors and the 
party of the member (Blake 1974, 26). To test if the same ministerial bias existed in the 
Newfoundland municipal capital works spending, we tested whether the districts 
represented by cabinet ministers as a group yielded a higher partisan index score than did 
Government districts as a whole.23 (See figure 4.2) The cabinet ministers' districts 
received more funding than the Government members as a whole in 1980 and 1981, but 
about the same in 1982. From 1982 to 1985 Cabinet Ministers received roughly the 
same as backbenchers and received slightly more from 1986 to 1988. Thus, for this 
period, Cabinet representation did not appear to be a crucial factor in the relative 
2311tis index was calculated by dividing the average allocation for cabinet ministers districts by the average 
allocation for Opposition members as a whole. 
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Figure 4.2 
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allocation of funds. This finding tends to undermine the conventional wisdom that a 
member has to be at the Cabinet table in order to obtain the maximum benefits for his 
or her district, at least with respect to municipal capital works spending. 
B. The Second Peckford Administration: 1982-1985 
The second Peckford Administration was a time of macroeconomic 
experimentation through increased spending in capital works. Since the recovery from 
the 1982 recession was slow in Newfoundland, the Peckford Administration hoped to 
stimulate the economy in 1983 and 1984 by spending over $40 million per year on 
municipal capital works (Newhook, 1991). Whatever the theoretical motivation for 
-. 
increased funding, allocations were no less skewed on partisan lines. The first two years 
of the administration were two of the three highest years : for partis~n bias. In 1983 the 
GOI index was 2.9, and in 1984 it ballooned up to 6;~~ the highest in the study period 
by far. Even for 1985, a year in which spending returned to normal levels, tht. index 
is 2.2. 
However a note of caution must be entered here. The 1982 election reduced the 
Opposition to a mere eight seats. With such small numbers/ the characteristics of the ·· · -
districts may account for more of the variation. Two of the Opposition districts were 
on the coast of Labrador. Torngat Mountains was a district with access to the Labrador 
Native Agreement for funding. Eagle River. while large geographically, had a tiny 
population and may not have requested as much capital funding in those years as other 
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districts. Those caveats having been made, it is still notable that the Opposition districts 
received very little in the years after the 1982 election. Port au Port received nothing 
during this time period. Bellevue received a mere one tenth of the average for 
Government districts, Eagle River one third, Fogo one fifth, and Strait of Belle Isle less 
than half. Only the Opposition district of Lapoile received same funding as Government 
districts. 
Meanwhile all the districts that went to the Government side in the 1982 election 
increased their funding. After receiving nothing in 1979 and 1980 as a Liberal District 
Carbonear received over $2 million in these years. Grand Bank received almost $2 
million up from $36 thousand in total in the previous three years. Lewisporte almost 
doubled its loans in the next three years. St. Barbe's funding quadrupled once it changed 
hands. Terra Nova was Liberal coming out of the 1982 election, and received less than 
half a million dollars in 1983. Once, however, it became Tory in the 1983 by-election 
the funding increased to one and a half million dollars per year in the next two years. 
Among districts the biggest recipient of funding is Conception Bay South, where 
over $8 million was spent in the Town of Conception Bay Souti in these three years. 
Even as a double district represented by two members it did well.24 In addition to an 
active lobby from its MHA 's and elected town council the Town of Conception Bay 
South had long roads that were sparcely settled, requiring expensive facilities to service. 
24Part of the sprawling municipality of Conception Bay South was in the District of Conception Bay South, 
and lhe rest of lhe district is in Harbour Main Bell Island for most of lhe time we are examining. Harbour 
Main-Bell Island also contains several olher small communities. 
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In Harbour Grace over $7 million was spent, In Green Bay $7 million, in Twillingate 
over $5 million, and in Bonavista North over $4.7 million was spent. Kilbride and Mt. 
Scio on the edges of St. John's were also treated well. 
Much of the spending in this period shifted to predominately rural districts. Only 
a modest amount went to Corner Brook ($5 million), Grand Falls ($8 million), 
Stephenville ($1 million), Conception Bay South ($7 Million) and Labrador City ($1 
million). Large amounts went to places like Triton and Little Bay Islands, especially on 
a per capita basis. In Happy Adventure, for example, over $4,000 per person was spent 
to put in a water system for about seventy families. The same kind of expense was 
incurred in putting water systems into Nippers Harbour, Trinity, Plate Cove East, 
Pinware, Appleton, Upper Island Cove and Brigus. 
For the first two years of this administration Hazel Newhook was the minister. 
In the fall of 1984 Norman Doyle became the minister and was responsible for the 
spending that was secured in 1985. In that year the partisanship ratio returned to the 
more normal level of 2.2. 
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C. The Third Peckford Administration: 1985-1989 
In the last three years of the Peckford era (1985-1988) capital works spending 
declined. From over $40 million in 1983 and 1984, the loan totals declined to the $30 
to $35 million range. In terms of real spending power, the lowest since the Tories took 
office in 1972. (See Figure 2.1) The total available for rural districts was further reduced 
when almost $7 million was allocated to St. John's for the first time thus reducing the 
yearly total by $2 million. The partisan bias continued however. In 1986 the GOI index 
dropped to 1.9 the lowest in six years, but it rose again in 1987 to 3.8 and then fell to 
2.8. Again the districts represented by Cabinet Ministers received only marginally more 
than the Government districts as a whole. 
In the 1985 election the Opposition parties' numbers almost tripled. In the 
process almost a dozen districts went into the Opposition ranks from the Government 
side. For almost all of them the result was considerably less municipal capital works 
funding in subsequent years. Bonavista North for example went from well over $1 
million a year before the election to less than $400 thousand on average for the next 
three years. Fortune-Hermitage saw its total funding cut in half, while Gander went 
from an average of over one million to half that. Menihek went from $2.5 million over 
three years to less than $1 million. Mt. Scio, Naskaupi, Port De Grave, St. Barbe and 
Stephenville all dropped. Twillingate went from five million dollars over three years to 
.) 
less than one million. In this climate, switching to the Government side had a 
.. ·. 
predictable beneficial effect. 
. ·""':"'::.:.· · 
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Although the PC Government won no new districts in the election, Jim Hodder 
and Garfield Warren both crossed to the PC's from the Liberals just before the 1985 
election. Port au Port was represented by Jim Hodder and went from no funding 
whatsoever in the second Peckford Administration to a total of $1.4 million in the third. 
Torngat Mountains, Garfield Warren's district, received nothing from this capital works 
program after he switched, but was able to access special Labrador Federal-Provincial 
agreements for municipal capital works funding during this time period. 
Although Grand Falls, Gander and Corner Brook receive some funds from the 
agreement, most of the money continued to be spread out among the smaller 
communities. Foithe first time, as well, St. John's had some of its loans secured by the 
Local Authority Guarantee Act and in the three years received almost $7 million. 23 The 
inclusion of the St. John's data had the effect of increasing the GOI more than it would 
have in these years. The GOI index is approximately five to ten percent higher in these 
years than it would otherwise be. 
Some of the smaller communities receiving large amounts per capita were Brent's 
Cove, Pacquet, Burlington, Irishtown, Summerside, Port Kerwin, Tilting, Garnish, 
Middle Arm, Little Bay, Lushes Bight, Brighton, Hughes Brook, Birchy Bay, Shoal 
Harbour and Cottlesville. In Conservative Green Bay fifteen different communities 
receive funding, compared to four in Liberal Fogo and six in Liberal Strait of Belle Isle. 
2
'St. John's districts are not included in this analysis, but it is worth noting that all were represented by 
Conservatives at this time 
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Since few of these rural communities were able to make significant payments on their 
loans when they came due, the funding to these districts more accurately resemble grants, 
grants that were distributed in a highly partisan manner. 
Overall the funding in the Peckford years clearly supports the proposition there 
was strong partisan bias, exceeding that of the 1970s. The correlation with changing 
representation introduces a control against any notion that this difference arose from non 
partisan factors. TI1e next Chapter will examine several districts that changed 
representation, as well as a sample of Opposition and Government districts that did not, 
to see if this conclusion th~t-: there was pronounced and persistent bias holds up on a 
district by district basis. 
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S. VARIATIONS IN THE DISTRICTS 
The global analysis of capital works spending from 1973 to 1988 presented in 
Chapter 4 shows considerable variation in the amounts spent on Government districts 
versus Opposition districts. Over the seventeen year period Government districts almost 
always did better each year and over time, sometimes by a considerable margin. But 
variation between districts, be they Government or Opposition, was considerable. There 
was, for example, considerably more spent in Green Bay than Bay of Islands, yet both 
were Government districts throughout the period. The purpose of this chapter is to focus 
more closely on the experience of particular districts. This will refine and reinforce the 
overall argument of this thesis: that partisan factors were of overriding importance in 
determining levels of funding. 
Individual districts will be examined in four distinct groupings. (See table 5.1) 
The first two include seven ruraP6 and thr~. urban districts that switched back and forth 
between the Government and the Oppositiori :._si~~f~Gf: the House. In almost all cases 
' . ·. . ..... :-~ 
switching from the Government to the Opposition side resulted in significantly more 
funding from the municipal capital works program. (See table 5.2) Often the difference 
was dramatic. The data also suggests that the when the representation changed the 
greatest effect occurred in the more rural districts. It may be that the larger town 
councils were more effective in lobbying the Government directly and were less 
:
6For the purpose of this study, any district in which the two largest communities do not make up over half 
the population is considered rural. 
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Table 5.1 -Districts Selected for Further Study 
An X indicates the district was won by the Conservative Government in that 
election, and barring a by--election remained on the Government side until the 
next election. 
1972 1975 1979 1982 1985 
Rural Swing Districts 
Terra Nova X X 
Baie Verte-White Bay X X 
Twillingate X 
Bonavista North X X 
Lewisporte X X X 
Port au Port X 
.St. Barbe X X X 
Urban Swing Districts 
Carbo near X X X 
Gander X X X X 
Menihek X X X X 
Government Districts 
Green Bay . ~ .. .:.--_,.. X X X X X 
Harbour Grace X X X X X 
Humber Valley X X X X X 
Opposition Districts 
Fogo 
Eagle River 
Strait of Belle Isle 
Bellevue 
I 
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Table 5.2 - Average funding for selected districts by representation 
In Thousar.'ds of Dollars Per Year 
Rural Swing Districts 
Terra Nova 
Baie Verte-White Bay 
Twillingate 
Bonavista North 
Lewisporte 
Port au Port 
St. Barbe 
Urban Swing Districts 
Carbo near 
Gander 
Menihek 
Government Districts 
Green Bay 
Harbour Grace 
Humber Valley 
Opposition Districts 
Fogo 
Eagle River 
Strait of Belle Isle 
Bellevue 
Government 
965 
618 
1,606 
1,514 
785 
273 
360 
532 
730 
611 
1,350 
1,168 
919 
58 
Opposition 
375 
307 
187 
750 
372 
164 
196 
387 
567 
157 
337 
194 
503 
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dependent on the influence of their member to secure funding. The third and fourth 
groupings include districts that did not change sides in the· study period. Three were 
Government districts and four were Opposition districts. The Opposition districts received 
very little over the seventeen year PC administrations, while the Government districts 
received much more. 
Table 5.3- Total funding by district, 1949 To 1988 
Both Water and Roads Funding 
In Thousands of Dollars 
List of Districts and multiple Districts examiner!-in the study. 
District 
Baie Verte-White Bay 
Bay of Islands 
Bellevue 
Bonavista North 
Bonavista South 
Burgeo-Bay D'Espoir 
Burin-Placentia West 
Carbon ear 
Eagle River 
Exploits 
Ferry land 
Fogo 
Fortune Hermitage 
Gander 
Grand Falls 
; . 
Before 1973 
3,980 
0 
1,315 
3,503 
700 
3,435 
2,395 
2,634 
0 
3,020 
0 
1,824 
1,065 
2,845 
1,000 
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After 1973 
11,794 
9,021 
1,697 
15,069 
12,524 
4,966 
12,180 
8,187 
3,105 
11,142 
6,513 
5,406 
6,510 
11,928 
12,592 
- , . • 
'- · 
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,. 
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Table 5.3 continued 
District Before 1973 After 1973 
Green Bay 1,163 21,603 
HM-CBS27 0 25,131 
Harbour Grace 1,790 18,699 
Harbour Main(Non 0 3,353 
CBS)28 
Corner Brook29 8,031 26,073 
I 
'• 
Humber East (NON 95 ... 76 
CB)3o 
Humber Valley 2,015 14,708 
Kilbride 0 7,642 
Lapoile 2,266 7,673 
Lewisporte 1,099 12,774 
Menihek 0 6,729 
Mount Pearl 1,905 10,409 
Mt. Scio 797 10,685 
Naskaupi 3,372 11,441 
Placentia 2,238 8,985 
Port De Grave 4,352 9,267 
Port au Port 294 3,176 
St. Barbe 625 8,187 
l'lFunding for the Town of Conception Bay South which overlaps the districts of Conception Bay South and 
Harbour Main. 
21 Allocations to the communities in the district of Harbour Main that are not Conception Bay South. 
29 Allocations for Hwnber East and West except as noted elsewhere. 
:sante part of Humber East not in Corner Brook. 
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Table 5.3 continued 
District Before 1973 After 1973 
St. George's 639 8,184 
St. John's 0 12,382 
St. John's East Extern 0 14,650 
St. John's Metro 765 1,499 
St. Mary's The Capes 1,074 4,198 
Stephenville 1,600 2,632 
Strait of BeJle Isle 3,683 8,051 
Terra Nova 956 9,087 
Torngat Mountains 0 1,065 
Trinity North 2,008 17,743 
Trinity-Bay De Verde 2,030 9,756 
Twillingate 1,453 7,539 
Windsor Buchans 3,619 4,483 
Total 77,558 440,514 
A. Rural Swing Districts 
1. Terra Nova 
Terra Nova was a new rural district, created in 1975 out of parts of the Bonavista 
North and Bonavista South districts. At the time the north side of the district was 
represented by a Liberal and the south side of the district by a PC. Prior to its 
establishment as a district, very little water and sewerage construction had been done in 
61 
the district. Less than one million dollars had been spent there from Confederation to 
1973. No funds were spent there in 1973 and 1974 while the communities were part of 
the other Bonavista Districts. In 1975 the Terra Nova district was won by Tom Lush, 
a Liberal who held the seat until he resigned after the 1982 election. In 1976 funding for 
Terra Nova matched the average for Government districts. (See figure 5.1) However 
funding collapsed in 1977 and 1978. It was only in the election period surrounding the 
1979 election that funding was restored. By 1982, however it had again collapsed to 
almost nothing. When the district went PC in the November 1983 by-election, however. 
the money started to flow again. By 1985 it had caught up to the Government average 
and has either matched or exceeded the Government average thereafter. 
Taken as a whole the ~~perience in Terra Nova supports the conclusion that the 
levels of funding was based heavily on partisan criteria. It was only in the 1979-80 years 
when Neil Windsor was Minister of Municipal Affairs the district received considerably 
more funding. Terra Nova received an average of $965 thousand each year while on the 
Government side of the house, and only $375 thousand while on the Opposition side. 
(Table 5.2) 
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Millions 
Capital Works in Terra Nova 
Opposition District 1972-1983 
Government District 1983-1989 
1.8~----------------------------------------~ 
1.4 ······ ······ ··············································· ·· ·· ··· ·· ········································· ···· ······· 
1.2 
1.0 ············································· 
0.8 
0.8 
0.4 
0.2 
0.0 1--1--...L-
1 
9 
7 
3 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
4 6 8 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 6 6 7 
- Government Average -Terra Nova 
Figure 6.1 
Capital Works in Baie Verte-White Bay 
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2. Baic Verte - White Bay 
Baie Verte -White Bay was created in 1975, primarily out of the old district of 
White Bay South. It is on the Northeast Coast, an area considered part of the Liberal 
heartland in the Smallwood era. In the 1972 election it remained Liberal, and again 
returned Tom Rideout, a Liberal, in 1975. Rideout would represent the district until 
1990, but changed over to the PC's before the 1982 election. Rideout would go on to 
become a cabinet minister in the Peckford government, and later. would succeed 
Peckford as premier in 1989. 
Of all the districts Baie Verte-White Bay offered the best opportunity for isolating 
the influence of party on capital works spending, since it was represented by the same 
man under two party labels. If the energy and interest of the member in securing capital ~ 
works funding was an important factor, it was held constant in this district. Equally 
constant was the "objective need" for capital works in the district. Variations in funding 
levels should have been primarily the result of the party connections of the MHA, 
together, perhaps, with variations in initiative on the part of municipal representatives. 
In the early 1970s the district did relatively well, receiving as much funding as 
Government districts (See Figure 5.2). From 1976 to 1980, however, the district 
experienced a drought relieved only by slightly higher funding in 1977. Following 
Rideout's conversion to the PC party in 1981, however, it did remarkably well, 
exceeding the Government average every year but two. In the 1981-1982 years over four 
million dollars was spent on capital construction. The Liberal years were lean, the PC 
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years fat. The average funding for Baie Verte-White Bay rose from $307 thousand per 
year in the Opposition ranks to over $600 thousand while on the Government side. 
3. Twillingate 
Twillingate has always been considered a bastion of Liberalism. During the study 
period it was represented by a Liberal or a Liberal Reformer (J. R. Smallwood in 1975) 
except for a three year interregnum from 1982 to 1985. In the 1985 election it returned 
to the Liberal fold. Again the results were dramatic. The capital works funding for the 
district was negligible for all but the three years from 1982 to 1985 when it was held by 
the PC's. In those years it did even better than the Government average. (See Figure 
5.3) It did receive some funds as a Liberal District when Neil Windsor was Minister in 
1979, and another amount in 1986 that may have been allocated to finish up projects 
started in the PC era. Other than that it was ignored almost completely. Funding for 
Twillingate is an anaemic $187 thousand per year as an Opposition district, and a healthy 
$1,606 thousand per year on the Government. side. (See table 5.2) 
4. Bonavista North 
Bonavista North was the ultimate swing district. From 1972 to 1985 it changed 
from the Government to the Opposition and back again every election. It was Liberal 
and on the Opposition side in 1972, went over to the PC's in 1975, returning to _the 
Liberals in 1979. It _then went back to the PC's in 1982 and finally back to the Liberals 
.. ;;::.-"' 
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Capital Works in Twillingate 
Government District 1982-85 
Opposition District 72-82, 85-89 
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Capital Works in Bonavista North 
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in 1985. Its ability to secure capital funding also swung back and forth. From 1972 to 
1975 it received more than the average for even Government districts, but its funding had 
been greatly curtailed in 1975. (See figure 5 .4) Once on the Government side funding 
picked up again, peaking in 1979~80 before dropping when it was turned over to the 
Opposition again. When the PC's recaptured the s~·~. the funding resumed, only to be 
cut down again in 1986-87 and 1988. While represented by Opposition politicians it 
received $750 thousand per year, but received twice that on the Government side. (See 
Table 5.2) 
5. Lewisporte 
Lewisporte is another swing district, having returned a PC in the 1972 election, 
·, 
a Liberal in 1975 and 1979, and a PC in 1982 and 1985. The municipal fundi• : t'eflects 
, , I, 
some of this activity, but there were periods when the District received considerable 
funding even while in Opposit~9n. Prior to 1973 Lewisporte had received over a million 
dollars in guaranteed loans which indicates that municipalities were putting in 
infrastructure. In the 1973 to 1978 period little more was done, with nothing being spent 
in 1976 and 1977 when it was a Liberal district. (Figure 5.5) The exception is 1975 in 
which a $2.2 million loan guarantee to Norris Arm was obtained. From 1977 to 1989, 
however, spending increased rapidly and kept up with the Government average, even in 
the Liberal y~rs from 1975 to 1982. After a PC was elected spending from 1983 to 
1988 was consistently above the average for Government districts. 
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Millions 
Capital Works in Lewisporte 
Government District 72-75,82-89 
Opposition District 75-82 
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Capital Works in Port au Port 
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6. Port au Port 
If there is such a thing as a Cinderella district, it is Port au Port. In this period 
it ranks almost last of the districts on the Island 31 in total funding. Part the reason may 
be the low level of municipal organization on the Port au Port Peninsula. Half of the 
area is unincorporated and these areas were therefore not eligible for municipal capital 
works funding at all. Despite these anomalies, the evidence of systematic bias towards 
the district seems strong. 
Port au Port as a district includes the Port au Port Peninsula, and the communities 
east of Stephenville leading towards the peninsula. Until 1975 it also included 
Stephenville. (Prior to the 1975 election the old Port au Port district was separated into 
two districts, Port au Port and Stephenville. Funding for Stephenville prior to 1975 is 
included with the Stephenviile District.) First capital works funding was received in 
1976, and continued at a modest level until 1980. (Figure 5.6) At this time the district 
was held by a Liberal, Jim Hodder, who had won it in 1975. From 1981 to 1985, 
however, the district was completely shut out when it came to funding for municipal 
capital works. Funding only resumed in 1986, 1987 and 1988, the three years after Jim 
Hodder crossed the floor to sit as a Tory in February of 1985. Despite this change, 
31 Because of the size and the low population of Eagle River <and Tomgat Mountains on the ~~ of 
Labrador, and because they had access co Native Agreements and the Coastal Labrador Agreement, they are 
not strictly comparable to the Island districts. 
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however, the funding for the district remained low when compared to the average for 
other Government districts. (fable 5.2) 
7. St. Barbe 
St. Barbe is another swing district, that elected a Conservative in 1972 and 1975. 
A Liberal was elected there in 1979, a Conservative in 1982, and a Liberal in 1985. 
Funding for St. Barbe was minimal throughout the years, with less than $5 million spent 
in the entire 17 years. (See figure S. 7) Some money was spent in the 1970s with 1979 
being the best year. Funding dropped off considerably from 1980 to 1982, and picked 
up somewhat in the 1983 to 1985 time period when a PC held the seat. Funding after 
1985 continued fitfully even though an Opposition member was in the seat. 
B. Urban Swing Districts 
The next three districts examined are Carbo near, Menihek and Gander. 
Carbonear is a true swing district having gone from the Government side to the 
Opposition side and back again. The other two, Menihek and Gander, were Government 
districts from 1972 to the mid 1980s. only changing from the Governmnet to the 
Opposition side in 1984 and 1984 respectively. Unlike the first seven districts examined, 
however, these districts have large urban cmmunities in them with well es~blished, 
. . ~ . 
-- ~-
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politically aware, municipal councils. They also had most of their water and sewer 
systems in place at the outset of the period under study and therefore sought capital 
funding primarily for road work. The road loans differ from the water and sewerage 
loans in that the municipality is required to pay back a fixed 40 percent of the loan. The 
Government pays the other 60 percent. 
1. Cnrbonear 
Carbonear was a m:u-ginal District, having gone PC in the 1972 election, Liberal 
Reform in 1975, Liberal in 1979 and finally PC again in 1982 where it remained until 
1989. The funding pattern reflects those changes. (See Figure 5.8) In 1973 and 1974 
funding exceeded even the Government average with a Government member, then 
declined to nothing in 1975 and 1976 under Liberal stewardship. Unexpectedly, 
however, it did well in 1977 and 1978. From then on funding declined rapidly until a 
PC member was elected in 1982. From 1983 until 1988 Carbonear District received 
about $800 thousand every year. It is possible to see some effects of political influence 
especially in the lean years of 1981 and 1982, but the evidence for that kind of bias is 
much weaker in the 1970s. The average received as an Opposition district is just under 
$400 thousand per year, while the district received over $500 thousand while on the 
Government side. This was a significant difference, but not nearly us large a difference 
as that experienced by the rural districts. 
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2. Gander 
Gander was a Government stronghold from 1972 until it was lost to the 
Opposition in 1985. It is a highly urban district with the large town of Gander (pop 
10,000) being its main component along with several small settlements. Political 
influence is almost imperceptible in the allocation of funds for Gander. It did reasonably 
well over the seventeen year span, obtaining a total of about $12 million in capital works 
loans. (Figure 5.9) It did especially well from 1974 to 1977 when Harold Collins was 
the MHA, less well from 1978 to 1981 and better again from 1982 to 1985 when Hazel 
Newhook, the local member, was Minister of Municipal Affairs. When it went to the 
Opposition side in 1985, it had a poor year in 1986, but it rebounded in 1987 and 1988. 
The highly urban nature of the riding may mean that the municipality itself had the kind 
of connections that were needed to overcome the normal partisan bias. In the 1983-88 
time period (when loans were broken down in the data by purpose) about forty percent 
of the loans were for road work. Since the community must demonstrate the ability to 
pay back their 40 percent of the loan, many small communiries could not apply for these 
loans. As a result there is less scope for political influence when a community is 
requesting mostly roads loans. Although Gander received about $1J0 thousand more on 
average (Table 5.3) as a Government district than it did as an Opposition district, the 
difference is less than if it had been a rural district. 
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3. Menihek 
There are only two municipalities in the Menihek District, Labrador City and 
Wabush. Both are "company towns," built by the iron ore mining companies. Most of 
the basic infrastructure was installed by the companies and most requests in this period 
were for repairs, extensions and repaving programs. Capital works requirements for this 
district were thus relatively slight. 
The district was represented by Government members from 1972 until a by-
election in October 1984 turned the district over to the New Democratic Party (NDP). 
The NDP held the seat until the 1989 general election. The only significant borrowing 
for capital works occurred in 1982 and 1983 when $4.5 million were spent on the water 
systems, primarily for sewage treatment facilities. (Figure 5.10) After the 1984 by-
election, spending dropped to almost nothing. 
C. Government Districts 
One of the Assistant Deputy Ministers (Haynes 1991) believed that funding would 
eventually taper off in Government districts as most of the work in the area that needed 
to be done was completed. These three Government districts have been selected to test 
that hypothesis, and to provide a comparison for the swing districts, and the purely 
Opposition districts that will be examined next. 
The next three districts were on the Government side from the 1972 election until 1989. 
All three were a mix of rural and urban communities. Green Bay had a large trading 
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centre in Springdale, Harbour Grace had Harbour Grace and Spaniard's Bay, and Deer 
Lake had Deer Lake and Pasadena. The rest of the communities in these districts were 
relatively small. 
1. Green Bay 
Green Bay was not a marginal district. From 1972 until 1989 it was represented 
by one man, Brian Peckford. From 1975 to 1976 Brian Peckford was Minister of 
Municipal Affairs, and from 1979 to 1989 he was Premier of the province. In 1973 and 
1974 Green Bay received less, on average, than the other Government districts, (Figure 
5.11) however after 1975 Green Bay received more municipal funding than any other 
single district in the province. In 1984, Green Bay received almost $5 million. In every 
other year Green Bay received more than the average for other Government districts. 
Although considerable sums were spent in the large centre of Springdale, even more was 
spent in small communities such as Pilley's Island and King's Point. Contrary to the 
expectation of the civil servants, capital spending in Green Bay did not "taper off", but 
increased substantially in the 1984 to 1988 period. (Figure 5.11) Green Bay received an 
average of $1.35 million per year over the entire seventeen year study period.(Table 5.2) 
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2. Harbour Grace 
Spending on Capital Works projects in Harbour Grace exceeded the Government 
average most years (Figure 5.12) with an exceptionally good year in 1984 when spending 
exceeded $5 million. Harbour Grace received less than the Government average on only 
five occasions and received nothing only once in 1975. If Harbour Grace municipalities 
were completing most of what had to be done, there was no evidence of that in the late 
1980s when the district received as much, if not more, than the Government average. 
Its average allocation of $1.168 million per year (Table 5.3) is exceeded by few districts 
in the province. 
3. Humber Valley 
Humber Valley is one of the Government districts that received a considerable 
amount of money during the PC administrations, a total of almost $15 million. Much 
of it was received in the late 1970s and early 1980s tapering off in the mid 1980s and 
increasing again in the late 1980s. (Figure 5.13) Humber Valley averaged just over $900 
thousand each year.(Table 5.2) 
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D. Opposition Districts 
The next four districts were on the Opposition side throughout the 17 year PC 
period. All three are relatively rural districts, with Eagle River the smallest in 
population with about half the population of an average district. Eagle River is also on 
the coast of Labrador and as a Labrador District is able to access funds from the coastal 
Labrador agreement for the construction of infrastructure. The other three districts are 
widely separated geographically. Strait of Belle Isle is on the Northern Peninsula 
adjacent to Labrador, Fogo is on the northeast coast north of Gander, and Bellevue 
straddles the Isthmus of Avalon connecting the Avalon Peninsula to the rest of the island. 
1. Fogo 
Other than the early 1970s and in the year 1987, funding in Fogo was quite low. 
There were five years in which no funds were spent in Fogo on municipal capital works 
Programs. In most other years the amounts were minimai.(Figure 5.14} The overall 
average in Fogo is just over $300 thousand. (Table 5.3} 
2. Eagle River 
Eagle River was a small district that received significant funding in 1980, 1982 
and 1983. (Figure 5 .15) For the rest of the period under study it received virtually 
nothing. Even though the funding was relatively small, the funding on a per capita basis 
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basis was often high. Pinware, for example, has less than 200 people and put in a water 
and sewage system that cost over $4,000 per person. 
3. Strait of Belle Isle 
The Strait of Belle Isle is the more urban of the Opposition districts we have 
examined, having St. Anthony with 3,000 people. Its funding was much less than the 
Government districts in all years but four, but it seems to have fared better than the more 
rural Opposition districts. (Figure.S.l6) In the mid to late 1970s and in the 1980s the 
district failed to receive grants on a par with Government districts. 
4. Bellevue 
Bellevue is a district created in 1975 from parts of the two Trinity Bay seats. 
One was then PC, and the other Liberal. In 1975 the seat was won by Wilson Callan, 
a Liberal Reform candidate who later joined the Liberals. ·. He held the seat until 1979 
when he stepped aside to let Don Jamieson, the new leader of the Liberal Party, run in 
his stead. When Jamieson later stepped down from the leadership and the seat, Callan 
regained the seat in an 1981 by-election. He then held the seat until he crossed the floor 
of the house in 1989 just before the general election when the Liberals were returned. 
During the period we are interested in the seat was Liberal, except for the part that was 
PC prior to redistribution in 1975. 
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Communitiesjn the Bellevue District have done abysmally in getting capital works 
grams. Although they had some success in the mid to lall! ll)?()s tht·y Wl'rt' t·:-~dmktl 
entirely from 1979 to 1982, and received little from then on. (Figure 5. 17) For the 
entire period under study the district received an average of just over $1 UU thousand per .. 
year, less than any other district in the province. 
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E - Summary of District Analysis 
In the seventeen cases discussed above it is clear that a district that changed 
representation could expect a significant change in the amount of municipal capital 
funding it received. Electing a Government member tended to result in additional 
funding; electing an Opposition member resulted in less fundin~. The same is also true 
,, 
· ' 
for the districts that have not been examined in detail. Table 5.4 lists all the districts 
examined. It shows that only four districts managed to receive more funding on the 
Opposition side than they did on the Government side. Those districts were Exploits, 
.. Mt. Scio and Trinity Bay De· Verde and Windsor Buchans. In Exploits, Buchans and 
Trinity Bay De Verde the amounts received while in Opposition are only slightly more 
than the district; received while in Government. Mt. Scio received considerably more 
while represented by an Opposition member, but it received most of that in t.ie 1980s 
when water and sewer systems .were being installed in one of St. John's fastest growing 
suburbs. 
With these exceptions noted, all the rest followed the pattern of the districts we 
have already examined. Burgeo Bay D'Espoir almost doubled its funding on the 
Government side, Burin-Placentia West did better, Fortune-Hermitage more than doubled 
its funding, Grand Bank received almost five times as much. Conception Bay South, 
Lapoile, Naskaupi, Port De Grave, St. George's and Stephenville all received more 
funding when they were on the Government side of the H7,use . 
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Table 5.4 - Average Spending by District by Representation 
In Thousands of Dollars Per Year 
District Government Opposition 
Baie Verte-White Bay 618 307 
Bay of Islands 530 
Bellevue 106 
Bonavista North 1 514 750 
Bonavista South 782 
Burgeo-Bay D'Espoir 411 232 
Burin-Placentia West 802 675 
Carbon ear 532 387 
Eagle Rive:· . 194 
Exploits 728 762 
Ferry land 407 
Fogo 337 
Fortune Hermitage 505 219 
Gander 730 567 
Grand Bank 583 115 t • • • _ _ l 
Grand Falls 786 
Green Bay 1,350 
HM-CBS 1,900 1,322 
Harbour Grace 1,168 
Harbour Main 209 
Corner Brook 1,625 
Humber East (Non CB) 10 
Humber Valley 919 
Kilbride 477 
Lapoile 698 404 
Lewisporte 758 372 ·' 
Menihek 611 157 
Mount Pearl 547 
Mt. Scio 583 871 
Naskaupi 607 245 
Placentia 561 
Port De Grave 813 616 
Port au Port 273 164 
St. Barbe 360 196 
St. George's 672 139 
St. John's 773 
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Table 5.4 continued ... 
District Government Opposition 
St. John's East Ext 915 
St. John's Metro 93 
St. Mary's The Capes 262 
Stephenville 172 161 
Strait of Belle Isle 503 
Terra Nova 926 375 
Torngat Mountains 62 
Trinity North 1,108 
Trinity Bay De Verde 542 617 
Twillingate 1,606 187 
Windsor Buchans 211 262 
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6. ACCOUNTING FOR THE VARIATIONS 
This study, to this point, has tested the hypothesis that differences in the allocation 
of municipal capital works funding in non-St. John's districts of the province over the 
period from 1972 to 1988 resulted to a significant degree from partisan bias. An index 
was created that demonstrated a province-wide bias in favour of Government districts 
over all but one year of the study period. In some years the bias was minimal, it others 
it was large. In one year, 1984, six times as much was spent in Government districts 
as in Opposition ones. Further district by district analysis of capital works spending 
showed that districts that switcht;d to the Government side tended to receive more in 
funding, while districts that went to the Opposition tended to have their funding 
decreased. The most pronounced shifts in funding tended to occur in the rural districts 
rather than the urban ones. The districts that remained on the Opposition side during this 
time period received much less than Government districts, while the consistently 
Government districts tended to receive more (See Table 5.4). 
During the span of this study the rural districts were overrepresented, that is they 
had smaller numbers of people in them than the urban districts in St. John's. This 
overrepresentation might have affected the analysis if one party or the other was · 
predominately rural. Once the St. John's region is omitted from the analysis (as it was 
for reasons discussed elsewhere), there is no party that can claim to be rural or urban to 
a noticeable degree. While some predominately rural districts such as Strait of Belle Isle 
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remained Liberal throughout the period of time, other rural districts like Green Bay 
remained PC thoughout the study. 
Several further questions need to be addressed about this analysis. The first is: 
"Is it possible that the need was actually greater in the districts represented by the 
Government members?" The other questions centre on where and how the decision 
making process became biased. How did the civil servants determine which projects to 
recommend? What role did the Minister of Municipal Affairs play in the process? Did 
the caucus backbenchers influt:_nce the process, and if so, how? Did the premiers play 
an important part in the process? In this chapter I intend to shed some light on these 
questions. 
A. The Greatest Need 
The lopsided distribution of capital works grants seemed obvious to the members 
of the Opposition as they attempted to secure capital works projects for the municipalities 
in their districts31• In the debates in the House of Assembly a number of arguments 
were used by the Government to counter charges of bias by the Opposition. The most 
frequently used argument was that even though the distribution may have looked biased, 
it, was actually just responding fairly to the areas with the greatest need. Sometimes the 
argument was extended by saying that this bias was an overdue attempt to make up for 
32Personal Observation. 
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the bias the Liberals had shown prior to 1972 when they controlled the Government and 
were dispensing the "goodies." 
Taking the second argument first, it is hard to argue that the Government was re-
balancing the bias of the previous Liberal regime. For one thing the Liberal Party prior 
to 1971 represented virtually all the seats in the province. The Liberals won all but three 
St. John's seats in the 1966 election. Since St. John's has been excluded from this 
analysis, it cannot possibly be a factor. As well the amount of money spent prior to 
1971 on this program was small in comparison to the spending in the period under study. 
If anything can be said of the rural districts of the province prior to 1972, it is that they 
were all equally neglected when it came to funding for municipal capital works. 
The other argument, that the greatest need generally occurs in the Government 
districts is nullified by the evidence presented in Chapter 5. Swing seats received much 
less in years when they were represented by Opposition members than when they were 
represented by Government members. Perhaps ·me most convincing argument against this 
explanation is the way in which Baie Verte-White Bay was treated after Tom Rideout 
switched to the Government side, and the way Port au Port was treated after Jim Hodder 
crossed the floor. The funding in both districts went up significantly. 
In 1989 the Department of Municipal Affairs released additional information that 
tends to weaken the argument that the money was going to the areas with the greatest 
need. The Department released a list reporting the amount of money, on a community 
by community basis, needed to complete the systems currently under construction. 
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Comparison of values on this list with the data on what had already been spent showed 
that both Government and Opposition districts had completed roughly the same 
proportion of their total projects. (See Table 6.1) 
Table 6.1 -Cost to Complete, 1989 
Total Cost, in millions of dollars, to complete 
All the water, sewer, and road projects currently identified 
Districts Cost to Spent to Total Percent 
Complete Date Cost Complete 
Government 
Opposition 
630 
324 
247 
104 
877 
428 
Source: Newfoundland Department of Municipal Affairs 1989 
28 
24 
The list included requests totalling almost one billion 'dollars. The amount 
requested by the municipalities can be compared to the amount that had already been 
spent. Government districts had spent 28 per cent of the total amount that was needed 
to complete their systems. Opposition districts. on the other hand, had only spent 24 per 
cent of what was needed to complete their systems. If need had been greater in the 
Government districts a smaller proportion of projects in Government districts should have 
been completed, not marginally more as was the case. 
Table 6.1 shows the breakdown for districts as they were in 1988. If over the 
previous seventeen years funding had been going to the Government districts because 
their need was greater then they had clearly caught up. If the difference between the 
Government and Opposition districts proves anything, it proves that at least in 1988 the 
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Opposition districts were slightly more needy than the Government districts as measured 
by the percentage of their systems that were complete. If need were thr. criteria then in 
the 1985 to 1989 period the Opposition districts should then have received more than the 
Government districts. In fact the reverse was true. 
B. Bureaucratic Influence 
Another explanation often used by Government politicians to explain the variation 
was that they were only foltowing the recommendations of their senior civil servants. 
If there was a bias it originated with the civil servants. Interviews with four key officials 
(all now retired) revealed disagreement about the degree of political influence on the 
process (Withers, Corbett, Haynes, Mercer 1991). 
All agreed that civil servants had significant input into the allocation process. 
Each spring the engineering division in Municipal Affairs sent out letters to the various 
communities asking them to submit their "wish list" for the upcoming year. A 
committee of civil servants then sorted the water and sewer proposals assigning them to 
one of three lists. The first list contained projects that must be funded because they were 
the ones that were in progress and needed additional funding to complete. These also 
included the projects that addressed great health risks. To be included in the first list the 
communities would also have to have their engineering design work complete. The 
second list contained proposals with the civil servants' priority for this year. It was these 
projects from the "B" list that accounted for the bulk of the spending in water and sewer 
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each year. The third list included proposals that were either too expensive for the benefit, 
or else had no engineering work done at all or were rejected for some other reason. 
Most of the civil servants interviewed said that proposals on the "A" high priority list 
usually received cabinet approval, but that political influence more often came to bear 
on the "B" list when projects that were not ready were pushed to the forefront. In some 
cases "C" list projects were approved. 
Some civil servants claimed there was a lot of political manipulation of the lists 
(Corbett 1991, Haynes 1991), while others said there was very little (Withers 1991). In 
fact if the civil servant's tenures are correlated with the various ministers it becomes 
apparent that they were seeing different practices because the practices were in fact 
different. During the tenure of Neil Windsor the civil servants see>iied satisfied with the 
allocation, but during the tenure of others they complained of excessive influence from 
the politicians. The civil servants who were in charge of the process in the 1980s were 
the most vocal in their complaints of political bias in the process. 
C. Private Members' Influence 
To get re-elected Government backbenchers felt they needed an argument that 
would influence voters at election time. The argument most used by the backbencher 
was that he had the Government's ear and he could get things done in his district. The 
most tangible way to demonstrate that access was to get funds for capital works. Glenn 
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Greening explained how this worked in the 1983 by-election33 in which he was first 
elected: 
There wasn't any commitments, there was probably some promises-- now 
there is a very thin line there. The Premier of the day [Peckford] would 
say now what do you need for that district? If I'm going to get elected 
we've got to pave the road from Musgrave Town to Bunyan's Cove ... 1 
told them that if I got elected the road would be paved.... The election 
was in December (1983) the road got paved in June of 1984. As a result 
[that was] the first time I took Bunyans Cove and Cannings Cove by 66 
percent. And the next election too. In 1982 [the previous election in which 
he had run] I had lost these towns. I have never lost Bunyans Cove since 
then. 
Not only did roads get tJaved and water systems get installed, but local people found 
employment on the construction projects. In return the backbencher was reelected. As 
the MHA for Terra Nova Glenn Greening bluntly explained it: "I got elected to get 
water and sewer in my own district." One Minister of Municipal Affairs supported this 
contention (Doyle 1991). He stated that when the cabinet was putting together the final 
list of what was to be done in municipal capital works, the cabinet would always check 
to see that each member of the caucus had a project that they could announce. In one 
case the civil servants said they had to go to a project that wasn't even on the "C" list 
to find a project for this member's district (Haynes, 1991). 
Greening admitted that a large part of his time is spent lobbying the Minister of 
Municipal Affairs to ensure that the projects he feels will help him are approved: 
33Gienn Greening was a backbencher in the Peckford Administration from November 1983 to 1989 
representing Terra Nova. He ran unsuccessfully in the 1979 and the 1982 election and was finally elected in 
1983. Municipal capital works funding in his district increased after his election. (see Figure S.1) 
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After that I would lobby the ministers any place that I would run into 
them, it could be a cocktail party, it could be driving in a car it could be 
anything. I would always edge my way in there and say I got to have this 
for Glovertown. And when I would hear through the grapevine that this 
was to be discussed at the cabinet meeting I'd always have at least one, 
sometimes more than one minister, not the minister responsible for the 
department but just another minister so that when the topic came up they 
would speak up and say don't forget Greening has got to have this 
particular area covered this year. The two I would ask to lobby for me, 
the two most effective were Jim Morgan and John Butt. John was a friend 
of mine. 
Greening not only lobbied himself, but he also brought in delegation after delegation to 
meet with the minister to put their case, and then arranged for the ministers to visit with 
the councils in their communities. 
Greening also indicated that some Opposition districts would be deliberately 
ignored: 
Often now I was sitting down with different individuals, elected officials, 
who said the hell with them we gave them this we gave them that they 
didn't vote for us so write em off. 
Greening reported that he had considerable influence when it came to other public works 
in his district: 
They were going to build this particular bridge one million dollars, and I 
needed one million dollars to do a road. So I happened to talk them into 
cancelling the bridge and giving the money for the pavement. I just got 
them to change their priority. 
Greening became an Opposition member in the 1989 election. Asked if the 
situation had changed since the Government changed in 1989 he said: "Quite a bit I 
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haven't got near the amount of funding I was getting ... " He was defeated in the May 
1993 election. 
D. Cabinet Influence 
There is a considerable amount of indirect evidence that the cabinet modified the 
list presented to it by the Minister of Municipal Affairs. Glenn Greening described how 
he primed cabinet ministers to lobby for his particular projects at the cabinet table. As 
well the statistical analysis of the global funding over the seventeen years of the PC 
administrations demonstrates that somehow the Government districrs were receiving much 
more funding than the Opposition districts. More directly Norman Doyle described the 
winnowing down process in which the available projects are cut to fit the budget 
available. He admitted that it was much easier to cut an Opposition member's project 
than one of his own caucus. The best evidence, however, co111es not from the politicians, 
but from the civil servants. 
Wynward (Wynn) Haynes was Assistant Deputy Minister of Municipal Affairs 
from 1976 to 1988. As the ADM in charge of technical matters, he was on the 
committee that prepared the list for the minister to present to the cabinet. Later he was 
·' 
one of the officials who received the list back from .the cabinet and then started the 
process to get the approved water and sewage systems built. Haynes explained that once 
the Minister had finished making his or her changes to the lists they would go to cabinet, 
sometime around the end of January. Finally about the end of June the approved lists 
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would reemerge from cabinet, then they would go out to the consultant and then to the 
municipality (Haynes, 1991) Haynes complained that 
when it came back from Government there was no resemblance whatsoever 
as to what had gone on .... [The] A [list] didn't get changed. The B's and 
the C's did get mixed up. At least SO percent of what was recommended 
from the cost point of view came back. 34 
Half the "B" list projects had been removed and replaced by lesser priority "C" list 
projects. If the "B" list was larger than the funds available, some projects had to be cut. 
If the funding was greater than the "B" list, some projects were added from the "C" list. 
This bargaining was done at the cabinet table. 
Cabinet members were the ones that decided which projects were cut and which 
projects were added on, but the evidence in Figure 4.2 suggests that they did not fund 
projects in their own districts any more than in those of other members of their own 
caucus. As Haynes said about the cabinet: 
They tended to say all right we won't leave Glenn Tobin out completely. 
He's got nothing ;\nd there's no priorities there but he's got to have his 
hundred thousand. Where can we put it. Oh he's got two friends and a 
house in Lewin's Cove or something we'll put it in there. Absolutely 
unnecessary.... these were not even on the B or C list. There was 
absolutely no need for them .. we knew there were only two house there. 
It's probably $50,000 a house at least. 
'
4When the submission went to cabinet it was divided into S lists. The first list, the • A • list contained about 
one to three million dollars worth of water and sewage projects. These covered the extreme emergencies and 
the debts to engineers and others that had to be paid. It was never tampered with. The "B" list would have 
up to 30 million dollars in water and sewage projects and was really the civil servant's recommended list. The 
·c- list could have up to 100 million dollars in water and sewer funding in it and was not recommended by 
the civil servants. The ·o• list had about 4 million dollars in 60/40 cost shared roads projects on it and was 
the recommended list. The "E" list had the remainder of the roads projects. 
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For this study, because of the secrecy of cabinet documents, it was not possible 
to directly examine the list that went to the cabinet and compare it to the one that came 
back several months later. However Mr. Haynes reported that up to half the list was 
altered. He stated that the alteration in the lists occurred every year he was the ADM 
(1976 to 1988). The only year he can recall that the list was not changed was in 1989 
when the Wells Liberal Government took over. By the time the Liberals formed a 
Government in May the list had to be released. Haynes thinks that the new Cabinet may 
not have had the time to change anything. He thinks that was unfortunate though: "Over 
all those years of the PC's being in there for so long the [Liberal] districts were 
completely neglected, and they were the priorities." 
E. Minister of Municipal Affairs Influence 
Apart from the Cabinet of all the parties to the decision on where funding should 
· be allocated, the Minister of Municipal Affairs seems to have had the greatest influence. 
Immediately after Brian Peckford became the Minister of Municipal Affairs, funding in 
Green Bay increased substantially. The same thing happened to Gander after Hazel 
Newhook became the minister. Haynes also claimed that Minister of Municipal Affairs 
Norman Doyle was meticulous in ensuring that his own district was well lool~ed after 
(Haynes, 1991). But the ministers influenced more than the sums expended in their own 
districts. They also defended the lists that their official~ put together from undue caucus 
and Cabinet influence. In 1983 a committee of senior civil servants was created to assign 
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a priority to the projects on the lists coming in from the regional offices. The Deputy 
Minister of Municipal Affairs was the chairman. He, along with the two assistant deputy 
ministers of Municipal Affairs and representatives from Health and Environment made 
up the committee. Haynes described the mandate of the committee this way: 
We judged priorities obviously from a health point of view ... there was 
sewage running over the front lawn ... Then we looked at the question of 
cost. In one place you've already got a system in there with water and 
sewer and with that $100,000 you can connect another 20 houses at $5,000 
each that's worth doing. If you take that $100,000 and put it into another 
district and you only get 3 houses at $33,000 each ... Basically we're trying 
to get as many people serviced in the country as possible. So that was a 
consideration we had. There were other considerations -- the quality of the 
consulting engineers we were using, and the previous experiences in that 
particular place. 
Once the committee had finished with the Jist it went to the minister for further work. 
The minister would then change two things. His particular district: he 
would be interested in getting the maximum for it. The second thing he 
would be interested would be to see that Green Bay-35, of course, got as 
much as possible. Otherwise his particular district might get shot down. 
This was absolutely consistent the whole time I was there. [1976-88] 
But there was also a steady stream of other members and community delegations 
lobbying the Minister. 
Now of course the other members of his party would begin to realize that 
capital works were going on so you would see them drifting into his office. 
Then he'd come out and say can't we do something for Mister A or Mister 
Jones. So there was some changes there, but narrow changes. The 
35From 1979 to 1989 Green Bay was the District represented by the Premier Brian Peckford. 
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minister then made a paper to Cabinet and presented it to Cabinet by the 
end of January. 
The ministers had varying degrees of success resisting the pressure from their colleagues. 
In Haynes opinion: 
Winsor is a strong character and he would have resisted to a certain extent. 
[Hazel Newhook] was so nice. The fact that she was so decent and she 
probably got swayed by her colleagues more than any of the others. 
[Norman] Doyle was very political. His decisions were based on votes 
entirely. He insisted on water and sewage in areas where there was plenty 
of room for septic systems, but they had water systems. 
When the ministers were ranked on their non-partisanship, using the bias index 
developed in Chapter 1 Harold Collins appeared the most evenhanded, actually favouring 
the Opposition districts in 1973. (See Figure 6.1) Val Earle and Neil Windsor were the 
next most evenhan.Jed since their distribution was in the 1.5 range. Next is Jerry Dinn, 
followed by Charlie Brett, Norm Doyle and Brian Peckford. Last was Hazel Newhook 
whose tenure was marked by the most lopsided allocation of funds in the entire seventeen 
year history. 
F. The Premier's Influence 
From 1972 to 1979 Frank Moores was premier of the province and the member 
for Humber West, one of the two districts that make up Corner Brook. From 1972 until 
1989, and all while he was the premier, Brian Peckford was the member for Green Bay. 
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Several of the civil servants interviewed felt that the premier's district received favoured 
treatment, at least in the Peckford Administrations (Corbett 1991; Haynes 1991). 
There is no doubt that Corner Brook received generous treatment while it was 
represented by ·Frank Moores. (Figure 6.2) However since the city was represented by 
two members the amount flowing to the premier's district was actually half the city total. 
This would mean that the money that went to the premier's district was only slightly 
above the average for Government districts. As well the sums spent in the district after 
1979 when Moores left were comparable to the pr~-'1979 funding. In some years. like 
• .... 
1981, they were greater. If Moores influenced the distribution of funds it was not 
apparent in the figures. (Figure 6.2) 
'.-~ · 
Brian Peckford's influence was another matter. When he was Municipal Affairs 
Minister the funds flowing into his district increased, and increased even further after he 
became Premier. (Figure 6.3) Green Bay had the distinction of having more capital 
works funds spent in it than any other district in the province.(See Table 5.3) Whether 
or not the premier was directly involved in the process is difficult to say. As we have 
seen Haynes suggests that the Ministers of Municipal Affairs were the ones responsible 
for seeing the premier's district received a generous amount of funding each year 
(Haynes 1991). Brian Peckford himself also claims that he took a strictly "hands off" 
approach to municipal capital works funding while he was premier (Peckford, 1991). 
There is thus no direct evidence which would prove that the premier himself caused 
funds to flow to his district so disproportionately. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
A. Summary of Findings 
The question . posed by this study is: "What partisan bias was there in the 
allocation of loans under the Newfoundland municipal capital works program from 1973 
to 1988?" Analysis of the funding on a year by year basis showed that ·districts 
represented by Government members consistently received larger amounts of funding 
than Districts represented by Opposition members. Examination of a number of 
individual districts showed that when a district changed from being represented by an 
Opposition member to a Government member its funding invariably increased. When 
the representation change went from Government to Op~osition, funding would decrease . 
. '1 ~ 
This effect seems to be more pronounced in rural distril~ts than urban districts. Districts 
represented by Opposition members for the entire study period received very little 
funding, while districts that were permanently on the Government side received 
considerably more. 
Interviews with civil servants established that after they had submitted lists based 
on the objective needs of the communities involved, the Minister. and then the Cabinet,. 
had their input and changed the priority of up to half the projects submitted. It seems 
reasonable, therefore, to conclude that partisan political considerations dominated the 
decision making process when capital works funding was being allocated. The influence 
was most directly felt at the Cabinet level when the lists were finalized. The Premier's 
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district, especially in the Peckford Administration, received even more than the usual 
Government district. 
The ministers of municipal affairs also appeared to play a part, not only in 
ensuring their districts were looked after, but in moderating the degree of political 
influence. By and large the stronger the minister, as perceived by his civil servants, the 
more equitable the distribution of funding. The weaker ministers did not seem able to 
defend the decisions of their civil servants and ended up yielding to the requests of their 
Cabinet members and caucus colleagues. 
The equity of funding also seems to be inversely related to the length of time the 
administration has been in office. In 1972 and 1973, at the start of the Moores' 
administration, funding was relatively evenhanded. Similarly the 1979 - 1980 years 
when Neil Windsor was minister were quite equitable. Later in the administrations the 
imbalance in the funding index became greater. What seems apparent is that the Cabinet 
makes more partisan allocations the longer they are in power. 
B. Concluding Observations 
In 1933 Lord Amulree performed the most systematic investigation of the political 
life of Newfoundland. What he found shocked his British sensibilities. Witness after 
witness painted graphic pictures of the patronage riddled politics of Newfoundland. They 
talked of politicians out to buy votes with taxpayers money, and of a denominational 
system of allocating everything from schools to civil service jobs to Government 
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contracts. The tenor of the inquiry was that no matter what was done Newfoundlanders 
were not able to govern themselves in a professional, civilized way and must give up 
their corrupt democracy. 
The practices of the Peckford Administration, as they relate to the allocation of 
municipal capital works funding, were they to come under Lord Amulree's scrutiny 
would, I am sure, also be condemned. The position of the Government MHA in 1933 
was that of dispenser of patronage, and arbiter of what went where in the communities 
(Browne 1981, 97). Under the Peckford form of governance the Government MHA's 
position in rural districts seemed similar. Often it was the Government MHA who 
decided if a road was paved, or whether a town's sewage would be. treated or its water 
purified (Greening 1991). At the very least the di~trict represented by the Government 
MHA would have more municipal capital works spending in his district that would 
Opposition members. Voters were heavily pressured to support the Government 
candidate, or else watch their sewage run into the ditches for years more. 
I would argue that these practices, so apparent to the rural voter, have done much 
to erode confidence in the whole political pror..ess. The political pitch of aspirants to 
political office is not that they are the best person for the job, but that as the Government 
member they could deliver the goods. We alsc ~ave paid heavily for these acts of 
partisanship in another way. The municipal capital works program has run up debts of 
close to a half billion dollars (Newfoundland Department of Municipal Affairs, 1989). 
Interest must be paid on these loans by all taxpayers in the province, whether they enjoy 
lOS 
the clean water and paved roads or not. The people of Port au Port and Bellevue were 
systematically denied anything but minimal services in this Conservative Government 
years, but they have had to pay the interest and principal on loans to every little 
community in Green Bay. Even today (1993) most municipalities have only to pay a 
fixed share of their revenue towards their loans (recently it was 20 per cent). In a rura! 
community in Green Bay this is likely to be less than five per cent of the total cost of the · 
loans they have been granted. In other communities that were not so lucky they may be 
paying up to half the costs of their loans or more since they would have been granted 
less. At the same time they may be drinking polluted water, be exposed to open sewers 
and have to fight choking dust from their unpaved roads in the summer. 
Looking back on the actions of these two PC Governments over the past seventeen 
years it is unfortunate that the opportunity to break with a history of partisan politics was 
lost. The Smallwood regime was accused of not living up to the opportunities to reform 
the political system given to it with Confederation (Pottle 1979). In the program studied 
here the Moores and Peckford administrations did not reform the political system either. 
In their handling of municipal funding they continued to foster the brokerage politics that 
had been the Newfoundland tradition for years. 
: Ultimately the entire system was able to thrive because of the peculiar nature of 
the Local Authority Guarantee Act. Ostensibly these loans were obligations of the 
community themselves, but the communities were unable to sell bonds on their own. The 
bonds had to be backed by the provincial Government. With no tax base most rural 
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communities were incapable of paying any more than a token amount on their loans. 
Since the provincial Government would then step in and pay most of the obligations for 
them, the loans ultimately became grants. Since the loan payments were tied to the 
capability of the community to pay rather than the si1e of the loan. the community had 
no incentive to do the work as economically as possible. On the contrary. there was a 
bonus for sinking deeper into debt. That bonus was a better water system or more paved 
roads. 
The former Ministers of Municipal Affairs, who because of their election defeat 
in 1989, are now Opposition members, claim that the system has not really changed 
much. They claim that just a short two years into their mandate the Liberal Government 
is now doing to the PC's what the PC's were doing to the Liberals all along (Windsor 
1991; Doyle 1991). 
C. Recommendations for Further Study 
This thesis is based on research into a specific program. That research and the 
analysis were performed using a computerized database. Because one doesn't always 
know what one is going to find, more is encoded than is actually needed. That presents 
opportunities for further research using the same database. 
· .It should be possible to isolate a half doien of the communities that received 
enormous sums for their systems on a per capita basis, and explore why they were 
funded. Tilting, in Fogo District, is a good example: Its cost to complete is going to 
107 
.·, 
.... ·-
~ .... . 
be enormous, yet despite the warnings from the civil servants, it was funded (Corbett, 
1991). The civil servant explained it by saying the mayor of the community was a 
personal friend of the Premier and used that influence to secure funding. 
In Fogo [in the community ot] Tilting the chairman of the council got a 
S million [dollar] water system ... The Premier had approved the money. 
Joe McGrath was a personal friend of the Premier it came clear out of the 
blue to us. There are only 200 to 220 people there [Census actually 414 
in 1986]. It costs something like 70 or 80 thousand dollars a family there 
(Corbett 1991). 
There is also the possibility of examining the awarding of capital works projects 
on a community by community basis. One backbencher told me there is an art to 
awarding public works so that it results in the best possible return at the ballot box. You 
must make the voters appreciative, without allowing other communities to feel left out 
· and jealous (Greening, 1991). 
Another area for research might be to examine whether or not an excessive 
allocation of capital works spending actually does deliver the votes at election time. It 
!s my sense that it could be a two edged sword. One Minister of Municipal Affairs told 
me that getting a water system in his district in the early seventies cost him votes because 
the people would now have to pay local water fees (Earle 1991). MHA Glenn Greening 
of Terra Nova claims that water and sewage systems do nothing to get votes for the 
member. Pavement, he claims, is much more effective at delivering votes.36 
36For those wishing. to do further research on the database, a copy has been deposited with the Political 
Science Department at Memorial University of Newfoundland, or a copy can be obtained from the author by 
forwarding a fonnatted 3.5 inch floppy disk. 
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Newfoundland Department of Public Works and Services, 1988. Historical Statistics of 
Newfoundland and Labrador Vol// (V), February, 1988 
Report of the Newfoundland Royal Commission, 1933. Lord Amulree, chairman. London. 
Cmd 4480 (i 
Report of the Royal Commission on Municipal Government in Newfoundland and 
Labrador, 1974. H. J. Whalen chairman. St. John's. 
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Appendix A • List of Informants 
Collins, Harold, Interview with, September 29, 1991 
Corbett, Ronald, Interview with, September 26, 1991 
Doyle, Norman, Interview with, September 28, 1991 
Earle, Val, Interview with, October 2, 1991 
Greening, Glenn, Interview with, September 27, 1991 
Haynes, Wynn, Interview with, September 28, 1991 
Mercer, Eric, Interview with, September 27, 1991 
Newhook, Hazel, Interview with, October 1, 1991 
Peckford, Brian, Interview with, October 1, 1991 
Winsor, Neil, .Interview with, October 2, 1991 
Withers, Peter, Interview with, September 26, 1991 
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Appendix B - Administrations 
Administration Start Date 
. . 
First Smallwood Administration May 27, 1949 
Second Smallwood Administration November 26, 1951 
Third Smallwood Administration October 2, 1956 
" 
Fourth Smallwood Administration August 29, 1959 
Fifth Smallwood Administration November 19, 1962 
Sixth Smallwood Administration September 8, 1966 
Seventh Smallwood Administration October 28, 1971 
Transitional Moores' Adm. January 18, 1972 
First Moores' Administration March 24, 1972 
Second Moores' Administration September 16, 1975 
First Peckford Administration March 17, 1979 
Second Peckford Administration April 6, 1982 
Third Peckford Administration April 2, 1985 
Rideout Administration March 17, 1989 
First Wells Administration May 5, 1989 
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Appendix C - Ministers of Municipal Affairs 
Minister Date of Appointment 
Harold Collins January 18, 1972 
H. R. V. Earle May 2, 1973 
A. B. Peckford October 7, 197 4 
Jerome Dinn September 10, 1976 
Neil Windsor October 20, 1978 
Hazel Newhook August 18, 1980 
__ ;:---
Norman Doyle October 2, 1984 
Charles Brett January 6, 1988 
Robert Aylward March 27, 1989 
Eric Gullage (Liberal) May 5, 1989 
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Appendix D - Districts listed by PoUtical Representation 
Government Districts marked X 
District 1972 1975 1979 1982 1985 
Baie Verte-White Bay X X 
Bay of Islands X X X X X 
Bellevue 
Bonavista North X X 
Bonavista South X X X X X 
Burgeo-Bay D'Espoir X X 
Burin-Placentia West X X X 
Carbonear X X X 
Eagle River 
Exploits X X X X 
Ferry land X X X X X 
Fogo 
Fortune Hermitage X X X 
Gander X X X X 
Grand Bank X X X X 
Grand Falls X X X X X 
Green Bay X X X X X 
HM-CBS X X X X / ~-; ;:::::=. Harbour Grace X X X X X ; .' 
Harbour Main X X X X X u 
Corner Brook (Hum E & W) X X X X X 
Humber East (Non CB) X X X X X 
Humber Valley X X X X X 
Kilbride X X X X X 
Lapoile ~ ... . -::·:~ . X X 
Lewisporte X X X 
Menihek X X X · X 
Mount Pearl X X X ·x X 
Mt. Scio X X X X'· 
Naskaupi X X X 
Placentia X X X X X 
Port De Grave X X X 
Port au Port X X 
St. Barbe X X X 
St. George's X X X X 
St. John's X x ·i. X X X 
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District 1972 1975 1979 1982 1985 
St. John's East Ext X X X X X 
St. John's Metro X X X X X 
St. Mary's The Capes X X X X X 
Stephenville X X X 
Strait of Belle Isle 
Terra Nova X X 
Torngat Mountains 
Trinity North X X X X X 
Trinity Bay De Verde X X X 
Twillingate X 
Windsor Buchans X X 
. . , 
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17 3 
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FEDERAL DISTRICTS 
1. Sonavista ·Trinity·Concllption 
2. Surin·St. George 's 
3. Gander·Twillingate 
4 Grand Falls · White Bay-labrador 
5 Humber St. Borbe 
6 . S1 . John 's East 
7 . St. John · ~ West 
NEWFOUNDLAND PROVINCIAL & FEDERAL 
ELECTORAL DISTRICTS 1979-1980 
PROVINCIAL DISTRICTS 
01 Bale Verte ·White Bay 
02 Bay of Islands 
03 Bellevue 
04 Bonavista North 
05 Bonavista South 
06 Burgeo-Bay d'Espolr 
07 Burin-Placentia West 
08 Carbonear 
09 Conception Bay South 
10 Eagle River 
11 Exploits 
12 Ferryland 
13 Fogo 
14 Fortune-Herm•tage 
15 Gander 
16 Grand Bank 
17 Grand Falls 
18 Green Bay 
19 Harbour Grace 
20 Harbour Main-Bell Island 
21 Humber East 
22 Humber Valley 
23 Humber West 
24 Kilbride 
25 LaPoile 
26 Lewisporte 
27 Menihek 
28 Mount Pearl 
29 Mount Scio 
30 Naskaupi 
31 Placentia 
32 Pleasantville 
33 Port au Port 
34 Port de Grave 
35 St. Barbe 
36 St. George's 
37 St. John's Centre 
SEE INSET 
ST.JOHN'S 
0 10 so 30 40 50 
Miles 
38 St . John 's East 
39 St . John's East Extern 
40 St. John's North 
41 St. John's South 
42 St. John's West 
43 St Mary's-The Capes 
44 Stephenville 
45 Strait of Belle Isle 
46 Terra Nova 
47 Torngat Mountains 
48 Trinity-Bay de Verde 
49 Trinity North 
50 Twlllingate 
51 Waterford-Kenmount 
52 Windsor-Buchans 
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Append;.x F .. Results Clf General Elections, 1949-1989 
" 
Election Seats Won %of Vote 
Lib PC NDP Oth Lib PC NDP Oth 
May 27, 1949 22 s 0 1 70 28 0 2 
Nov. 26, 1951 24 4 0 0 64 35 0 1 
Oct. 2, 1956 32 4 0 0 67 32 0 2 
Aug. 20, 1959 31 3 0 2 58 25 7 10 
Nov. 19, 1962 34 7 0 1 59 36 4 1 
Sep. 8, 1966 39 3 0 0 60 33 2 2 
Oct. 28, 1971 20 21 0 1 44 51 2 3 
Mar. 24, 1972 9 33 0 0 38 60 0 2 
Sept. 16, 1975 16 30 0 5 37 46 4 13 
June 18, 1979 19 33 0 0 41 so 8 1 
Apr. 6, 1982 8 44 0 0 35 61 4 0 
Apr. 2, 1985 15 36 1 0 37 49 14 1 
Apr. 20, 1989 31 21 0 0 47 48 4 1 
Sources: Newfoundland Chief Electoral Officer 1989, 21-22; Graesser 1991, 2) 
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